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In January of 2012, we teamed up with representatives from the sustainability department at 
The Dow Chemical Company with the goal of creating a viable, creative solution that would 
advance The Company’s efforts to address the risk associated with freshwater scarcity. 
With uncertainty surrounding the impacts of climate change and other environmental threats, 
it is becoming increasingly important for corporations to fully understand and incorporate the 
value of the benefits nature provides into strategic decisions. The focal ecosystem service of 
our project was freshwater provisioning. Freshwater is critical to l ife and a key ingredient to 
many economic activities, such as power generation, agriculture and industrial processes. 
Water scarcity is of particular interest to Dow, given that 20 percent of The Company’s global 
production comes from the Freeport, Texas facility on the water-stressed Brazos River.1 Water 
is used as both an input to production and a coolant for electricity generation. The growing 
uncertainty around the future supply of water could threaten continuity of operations at 
Freeport and other increasingly water-stressed sites.2 
 
After surveying the common responses to water scarcity, the team broke down these various 
solutions into three categories: technology-based, policy-based, or management-based. 
Management-based solutions, defined here as responses developed within the organization 
that involve changes to internal policies and processes, were determined to hold the most 
promise for creating a robust, organization-wide solution for potential freshwater scarcity. 
 
We conducted a broad search to identify creative management responses by a variety of 
institutions to natural resource challenges  and selected ten types of responses, referred to as 
“analogues,” exemplified through one or more specific case studies. We then considered how 
each analogue could be adapted to the unique characteristics of water and the context of the 
corporate setting. Our five-step methodology including the following: 1) develop criteria for 
evaluating the analogue cases; 2) identify and evaluate the cases against those criteria; 3) 
deconstruct each case to determine the mechanisms driving effective resource management 
decisions; 4) adapt those mechanisms to the freshwater challenge; and 5) as necessary, adapt 
those mechanisms to the corporate context. 
 
We then evaluated the purpose, strengths and weaknesses of each analogue and identified 
common enabling conditions, benefits and limitations. After considering commonalities, we 
compared and mapped out unique benefits and limitations for application to freshwater 
scarcity in the corporate context.  
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The analysis was used to provide a strategic recommendation for addressing water scarcity at 
The Dow Chemical Company. Building from the analogue benefits and limitations outlined 
above, we were able to identify a way in which multiple analogues could be used in a 
complementary manner to achieve Dow’s goals within its particular organizational context. The 
initial proposal incorporated mechanisms from carbon taxing, infrastructure portfolio standard, 
and revolving fund analogues.  These analogues provided mechanisms to generate and allocate 
capital by placing a tax on water use, with fee revenue dedicated to a revolving fund.  This 
revolving fund financed water projects prioritized through the portfolio standard.   
 
Through further iterations and discussions with environmental and finance staff at Dow, we 
further refined our proposal to combine elements from two analogues– infrastructure portfolio 
standards and revolving funds – with a balanced scorecard approach to performance evaluation.  
In this case, capital is allocated internally to a fund that is used to finance projects prioritized by 
the portfolio standard.  Projects are evaluated and reviewed for continued funding based on a 
scorecard that considers both financial return and other beneficial outcomes.  This 
recommended strategy is sensitive to the financial realities and processes within Dow and is 
flexible to allow for the varied operational and policy contexts in which Dow faces freshwater 
scarcity challenges around the globe. Further, it addresses the desire of The Company to frame 
and address sustainability holistically, while still using freshwater scarcity as a focal challenge 
within the new effort.  
 
We believe that the analogues analyzed in this report can be combined in multiple ways to 
overcome a broad range of sustainability challenges. The analysis is designed to illuminate the 
potential applications of the mechanisms underlying each analogue. We hope that it inspires 
readers to think more broadly and creatively about effective options for responding to natural 





SECTION I | INTRODUCTION 
 
Humans experience myriad benefits provided by the natural world. These resources and 
processes, or “Ecosystem Services”, include pollination, freshwater provisioning, coastal storm 
surge protection, and many more. The concept of ecosystem services first entered the broader 
conversation on global environmental issues with the publication of the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment in 2005 and has been gaining increasing popularity as a framework for 
conceptualizing mankind’s relationship with nature ever since.3 Yet the environment’s ability to 
provide for human society is not unlimited. As global populations rise and resource demands 
continue to increase, we are seeing significant erosion in many of the services upon which we 
depend.4 This poses threats to society in general, and their economies in particular, which have 
only just begun to understand the importance of these services. 
 
In January of 2012, we teamed up with representatives from the sustainability department at 
The Dow Chemical Company with the goal of identifying viable, creative solutions that will 
advance The Company’s efforts to address the risk associated with freshwater scarcity.  
 
With uncertainty surrounding the impacts of climate change and other environmental threats, 
it is becoming increasingly important for corporations to fully understand and incorporate into 
strategic decisions the value of the benefits nature provides. The private sector is gradually 
beginning to realize the importance of ecosystem services in global business operations. 
However, these considerations are rarely incorporated into decision-making. Experts predict 
that firms will need to develop a new set of competencies to manage the relationship between 
company and nature.5 Incorporating a value of nature’s services into more traditional corporate 
decision-making processes will be critical to recognizing and optimally managing in times of 
increasingly scarce natural capital. 
 
The focal ecosystem service of our project was freshwater provisioning. Freshwater is critical to 
l ife and a key ingredient to many economic activities, such as power generation, agriculture and 
industrial processes. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, freshwater demand grew twice as fast as population in the past century. 
Increased consumption was driven by population and income growth and economic activity. 
Demand is projected to grow 55 percent by 2050, with manufacturing demand increasing by 
over 400 percent and demand from thermal electricity generation growing by roughly 140 
percent.6 At the same time, approximately 3.9 billion people, or 40 percent of the world’s 
population is predicted to live in river basins experiencing severe water stress by that time.7 
Growing demand, lessening supply, and lower natural ecosystem capacity to mediate water 
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events l ike floods and droughts will exacerbate already severe water-related problems and will 
l ikely impact economic growth. The rate of groundwater depletion, which doubled between 
1960 and 2000, is also likely to increase. Without appropriate mitigating action, water quality is 
expected to deteriorate due to nutrient flows from agriculture, poor wastewater treatment and 
the rise of new micro-pollutants. Economic value of assets at risk from floods and other water 
related disasters is predicted to be US$ 45 trillion by 2050, a growth of 340 percent from 2010.8 
A 2012 report issued by the U.S. intelligence community (ICA) asserts that “during the next 10 
years, water problems will contribute to instability in states important to U.S. national security 
interests.”9  
 
One organization that has emerged on the front l ines of ecosystem-inspired decision-making is 
The Dow Chemical Company. Dow is a global chemical, advanced materials, agrosciences and 
plastics manufacturing company that relies on an array of ecosystem services to provide raw 
materials and facilitate the production of various products. The Company has facilities in 36 
countries around the world and has revenues upwards of $59 billion annually.10,11 The Company 
is structured as a “matrix”, with organizational divisions based on business unit, function, and 
location. As a global industrial enterprise, Dow is seeking innovative, pragmatic and efficient 
means to incorporate growing environmental concerns into business decisions and operations.  
 
Water scarcity is of particular interest to Dow, given that 20 percent of The Company’s global 
production comes from the Freeport, Texas facility on the water-stressed Brazos River.12 
Currently, The Company holds water withdrawal rights from the Brazos River, on which it 
depends.13 Abundant freshwater is a necessity for Dow’s Freeport operations. It is used as both 
an input to production and a coolant for electricity generation. Specifically, freshwater is 
integral to the production of propylene glycol, a feedstock in a range of Dow’s other chemical 
manufacturing operations globally. As water levels in the Brazos increasingly fluctuate, the 
growing uncertainty around the future supply of water could threaten continuity of operations 











SECTION II | BACKGROUND AND PROCESS 
 
Choosing an Ecosystem Service 
Arriving at Freshwater Provisioning 
 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment l ists 24 key ecosystem services that society relies upon 
heavily. Rather than looking broadly at challenges across multiple services, we chose to 
investigate the service most critical to Dow’s continued global production—water. This allowed 
us to dig much deeper into the intricacies and challenges of the specific service and to offer 
more robust and focused recommendations. To determine which ecosystem service should be 
our focus, we conducted conversations with members of Dow’s sustainability team, including 
the Vice President of Sustainability and the Director of Sustainability Programs. (See Appendix A 
for a l ist of individuals consulted). The initial list of potential focal services included freshwater 
provisioning, coastal surge protection, and air quality. Based on our discussions with Dow, 
freshwater emerged as our focal ecosystem service because water is a critical input for The 
Company’s operations in many locations globally, and the availability of the resource is l ikely to 
change significantly in supply, regulation and price in the near future. Freshwater provision is 
also a service that Dow shares with thousands of local stakeholders around the globe, making 
responsible water management a priority not only for profitable operations, but also for 
maintaining Dow’s l icense to operate in water-stressed localities. 
 
Access to and use of freshwater presents a number of unique challenges, and to create 
recommendations that address the true challenges of freshwater management, we needed to 
know the specific differences between water and other resource issues. The team consulted 
Dow staff and environmental leaders in the freshwater arena (see Appendix A) to determine 
what makes water such a unique management challenge. Secondary research was performed 
by inventorying academic and online sources of environmental study, including electronic 
databases, in-print collections at the University of Michigan Library, and online sources (see 
Appendix B) to better understand what the current state of knowledge around resource 
management and freshwater security. We determined that water has a number of qualities 
that make it uniquely challenging in terms of natural resource management, thus separating it 
from many other ecosystem services, including: 
 
Water is essential to biological life 
On a fundamental level, water is essential to l ife and has no substitutes. This fact leads to a 
contentious set of human rights issues during times of extreme scarcity, placing corporate 
water management in a potentially controversial place. 
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Availability is local 
The geographic nature of freshwater means that any improvements made to address water 
availability are largely confined to the particular watershed. Common strategies for addressing 
other environmental challenges, such as carbon offsets, must be adapted to address a resource 
that his highly localized rather than globally dispersed.  
 
Freshwater availability fluctuates temporally and non-linearly 
Fluctuation in freshwater availability on the local or watershed level means that water scarcity 
is often not a constant threat. It may vary with season or year-to-year, and shortages can be 
temporary. This high degree of variability makes any associated risk assessment and planning 
increasingly challenging.  Ambiguous threats, such as acute freshwater shortage, lend 
themselves to a different kind of corporate response, since issues seen as temporary are often 
viewed differently in the management context than those with a steady signal. 
 
Water has both consumptive and non-consumptive uses 
Water is used in many industries in both consumptive and non-consumptive ways. 
Organizations that generate electricity on-site, for example, often require large volumes of 
water for cooling purposes. This non-consumptive use removes water from the watershed only 
temporarily. Consumptive use, on the other hand, uses water as an ingredient in the creation of 
a product. This means any water used is effectively removed from the local environment 
permanently. 
 
Water quality and temperature vary 
Unlike a unit of energy or a molecule of carbon, water comes in different types that have 
varying potential for usability in industrial, social, and natural systems. Many uses of water, 
whether consumptive or non-consumptive, require a high level of purity, necessitating some 
form of purification between intake from the natural system and use. Further, many states also 
regulate the reintroduction of wastewater into the environment, requiring organizations to 
clean non-consumptively used water before discharge back into the watershed. 
 
Similarly, water temperature is not constant in its natural state or across the cycle of its 
extraction, use in industry and return. Cooling water used in thermal electricity generation is a 
prime example of a non-consumptive use that alters the temperature of the water, with 
discharge back to the source typically being warmer than is the intake water. As with water 




Water is often relatively inexpensive for large-scale industrial consumers 
While most inputs to industry today carry a significant cost for the company, water itself often 
does not. Because the cost of water is sometimes negligible, the monetary savings from 
reduced use are also negligible. This creates issues when considering efficiency projects, which 
will  have an inherently low return on investment.  
 
 
Determining the Approach 
Technology, Policy, or Management-based Solutions 
 
Based on these unique characteristics of water, and with the goal of creating a robust strategy 
for addressing freshwater supply risk, we conducted an extensive inventory of available 
research on corporate ecosystem service decision-making (see Appendix B for a full list of 
publications reviewed). Responses to water scarcity as they relate to the private sector were 
organized into three categories: technology-based, policy-based, or management-based, which 
are explained in greater detail below. We determined an optimal corporate response to natural 
resource challenges would meet the following three criteria: 
 
1 Expertise 
The corporate department or team charged with 
implementing the solution would have some level of 
expertise in the subject, based on academic or professional 
experiences. 
2 Control  
To the extent possible, the success of the response would 
depend on the actions of the corporation and not be 
dependent on outside forces.     
3 Universality 
The solution would have to work both in a variety of 





Each response category was evaluated based on these criteria, beginning with technology-
based solutions. These responses involve use of a specific technology, such as desalination, to 
achieve freshwater security. Ultimately, any technology-specific recommendation would have 
limited longevity since technologies advance, mature and are superseded relatively quickly.  
Technological advancement and changing dynamics of water availability will also surely 
significantly change the economics of any technology recommendation. The field is also 
advancing in uncertain directions, and new solutions are likely to come online in the future that 
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will  upend current thinking and considerations. In addition, continuous monitoring of 
technological advances would be an impractical recommendation for corporations without also 
recommending they hire additional internal expertise. 
 
Policy  
Policy-based solutions require a specific regulatory environment to be successful. For example, 
purchasing water rights to ensure a continued volume of freshwater would depend on a system 
that allows this kind of transaction to occur. Based on a concurrent collaboration between The 
Nature Conservancy (TNC) and Dow, we were able to work closely with water policy experts at 
TNC to examine different policy landscapes in both water-stressed and water-secure areas 
where Dow operates. We conducted a basin-level analysis of water governance for 22 water 
stressed and water secure regions where Dow currently has operations (see Appendix C). This 
research revealed that the policies governing freshwater in each Dow location can be 
significantly different. As an organization with a widespread global presence, Dow is operating 
in numerous policy environments, and any recommendations made would be of l imited use to 
the organization as a whole. Further, as water demand continues to rise and the critical 
resource becomes increasingly scarce, water policy is also certain to change in unpredictable 
and non-uniform ways. 
 
Management 
Management-based solutions are responses that are developed within the organization and 
involve changes to management policies or processes. Environmental examples include levying 
an internal carbon fee or administering a revolving loan fund to finance energy efficiency. 
Unlike technology- or policy-based solutions, management responses have the potential to be 
both widely applicable across the geographies occupied by any particular organization and long-
lived. Internal solutions can work anywhere the company operates since they are based within 
the organization, unlike policy-based responses that depend on specific regulatory 
environments or technologies that are optimized for a specific resource context. Further, 
appropriately developed management-based responses can remain relevant until the 
organization fundamentally restructures or changes its strategic goals.  For these reasons, the 




Methodology of Approach 
Introduction to the Analogue Concept 
 
To create a management-based solution grounded in proven success, we pursued an approach 
that sought to adapt other common or creative management responses to natural resource 
challenges to the specific context of increasing corporate freshwater security. These became 
known as our study’s analogues. For each analogue, we evaluated one or more examples, or 
“cases” of the analogue’s application. Our methodology involved five steps: 1) develop criteria 
for evaluating the analogue cases; 2) identify and evaluate the cases against those criteria; 3) 
deconstruct each case to determine the mechanisms driving effective resource management 
decisions; 4) adapt those mechanisms to the freshwater challenge; and 5) as necessary, adapt 










To create a set of criteria that would evaluate each case effectively, the team consulted both 
online and in-print sources, including publications on corporate water risk by CERES, l iterature 
on water accounting by The Pacific Institute,15 and emerging research on water stress 
mitigation by the AquaStress Integrated Project16 on domains private resources management, 
corporate accounting and culture, and freshwater as a resource. To ground our analysis in the 
specific Dow Chemical Company operational and management context, the team consulted 
management, operations, strategy, finance, and environmental specialists within Dow. Table 1 
includes an outline of data collection methods and Appendices A and B for additional details on 






















Figure 1: Visualization of research methodology 
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Table 1: Literature Review and Interviews  
Science and Water 
Policy 
Scientific Perspective: Reviewed both scientific literature and the work of 
organizations to address freshwater scarcity. This included publications 
by CERES,17 The Pacific Institute, 18 The Nature Conservancy,19 The 
Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), 20 and more. 
Policy Response Mechanisms: Reviewed regulations and institutions in 
Brazil, Texas, and other areas where Dow operates to gain an 
understanding of the various policy mechanisms that govern freshwater 
access, including water markets, withdrawal permits, etc. 
Corporate Response Mechanisms: Reviewed industry guides and case 
studies to understand the methods, challenges, and best practices for 
managing environmental regulation, resource scarcity, and ecosystem 
services risk, including publications by the World Business Council on 
Sustainable Development21 and the World Resources Institute.22   
Corporate and 
Municipal Response 
Risk Assessment: Consulted finance and strategy experts at The Dow 
Chemical Company to understand corporate methods to predict resource 
availability and other risk assessments, as well as their applications to 
strategic planning. 
Review of Past Work: Reviewed current and developing sustainability 
projects at Dow through press releases and information provided by 
members of Dow’s Sustainability Department.  
Review of Water Use: Consulted staff at Dow’s Freeport facility and 
former director of sustainable development at Dow to assess current and 
future water use, along with challenges that exist to standard resource 
management approaches. 
 
This information was then used to establish the criteria by which potential analogue cases 
would be evaluated. These criteria, laid out in Figure 2 below, represent the most appropriate 






Once we created a framework for evaluation, we identified analogues that could be analyzed 
using these criteria. Identification of potential analogues began through a process of team-
based discussion on which resource issues were to be included. A broad search was then 
conducted of print, scholarly, and academic literature to identify potential analogues for further 
investigation. Selection was based on subjective measures of perceived impact and potential 
for application to water and the corporate context as well as for a broad array of approaches to 
be used for comparative purposes. Ten analogues were chosen for study. Some analogues had 
several “cases” of implementation by different institutions, showcasing different methods of 
application of the same underlying analogue principle, while others are represented by a single 
case example. 
 
Each analogue was reviewed and grouped into four broad themes to highlight commonalities 
and differences (See Figure 3). This grouping is not intended to be definitive. Rather, the 
groupings and order of explanation that follows are intended to call out the most important 
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Figure 3: Grouping of cases by analogue and theme 
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SECTION III | THEMES AND ANALOGUES 
IIIA | Theme 1: Pricing Externalities   
 
One of the most vexing problems that corporations deal with in response to ecosystem and 
natural resource challenges is whether and how to incorporate ecosystem value and risk into 
the company’s financials. Firms recognize that ecosystem resources hold strategic value, that 
damaging them creates externality costs, and that a lack of them may present regulatory or 
production risks in the future. However, given the absence of external markets for most 
ecosystem services and the high degree of uncertainty regarding their future states, firms rarely 
have good methods of pricing the value of or risk posed by ecosystem services. This section 
draws lessons from carbon taxing and shadow pricing,  two mechanisms designed to help 
corporations place an internal “price” on carbon that better reflects the negative externalities 
or negative effects of a product or activity not captured monetarily.23 Carbon pricing is used to 
address greenhouse gas emissions,a the principal driver of anthropogenic climate change.  
 
In the first decade of the 2000s in particular, addressing the external costs of carbon dioxide 
emissions was an important topic. Governments and companies widely discussed putting a 
price on carbon emissions, and some enacted such prices. The operational carbon prices 
implemented more recently by Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) and The Walt Disney 
Company (Disney), i llustrate different but related carbon fee application strategies. The 
examples of Royal Dutch Shell (Shell) and Google, Inc. (Google), on the other hand, i llustrate the 
application of a price on carbon emissions in the analysis of future investments as opposed to 
current business operations. This second approach is forward looking and therefore does not 
involve actual flows of money or emissions of greenhouse gases at the time that the shadow 
pricing tool is employed. The benefits and challenges of carbon pricing via these two methods 
are discussed, followed by the potential for application to corporate freshwater strategy. 
 
Natural Resource Challenge: The negative externality and true cost of carbon dioxide emissions 
is not incorporated into the financial cost of business operations.  The application of a fee on 
actual or projected emissions of carbon dioxide can be used as a tool to internalize and 
monetize the externality cost of greenhouse gas emissions.   
 
 
                                                   
a Throughout this paper, the terms greenhouse gas emissions, carbon, carbon emissions and carbon dioxide 
emissions are used interchangeably. 
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IIIAi | Analogue: Carbon Taxingb 
 
Emissions taxes are typically applied per ton of actual carbon emitted. The number of tons 
emitted is calculated via “carbon footprinting,” which applies carbon emission factors to 
records of carbon-emitting activities, such as gallons of gasoline burned, passenger-miles flown 
or kilowatt-hours of electricity used. The level of the tax can vary widely among tax systems. 
Similarly, there is a wide range of estimations as to what the true cost of carbon is that should 
be used as the externality cost (the tax) in such systems. 
 
Organization: Microsoft 
Brief summary: The Microsoft carbon neutrality pledge is rooted in the company’s 
acknowledgement that the “alarming” trajectory of climate change indicated by the scientific 
data demands a “comprehensive and global response.”24 Announced in May 2012, Microsoft 
pledged to become carbon neutral by the end of their 2013 fiscal year in July 2013. In addition 
to continuing to improve its own greenhouse gas emissions footprint through efficiency and 
renewable energy investments, Microsoft designed a carbon fee that will apply to all offices, 
business air travel, data centers and software development labs across more than 100 
countries.25 Microsoft uses the carbon tax to fund the purchase of renewable energy credits 
and carbon offsets to achieve neutrality. Microsoft’s tax is applied at a relatively granular level 
in order to engage at the level of decision-making. 
 
Microsoft is measuring carbon in various operational buckets, including plug load (electricity 
used) and business travel on a per-mile basis. The company then offsets each category by 
purchasing renewable energy certificates (RECs) for electricity and carbon offsets for travel.26  
The price charged for each unit of carbon emitted by a business team will be based on the cost 
of carbon offsets and RECs, thereby moving towards full cost accounting for emitting 
activities.27   
 
Results: According to one observer’s estimate, the Microsoft carbon fee could raise about $50 
million to invest in carbon offsets and RECs by 2020.28  Additionally, Microsoft expects to realize 
a number of co-benefits as a result of taking this sustainability step, including operational cost 
savings through efficiencies, employee engagement, consumer goodwill, and attention to 
Microsoft’s own carbon management tool offerings. Microsoft’s leadership also views this 
initiative as an opportunity to be proactive in light of a potential global carbon polic y.29 
 
                                                   
b Using a tax to incentivize reduced carbon emissions is one of the more simplistic systems to achieve emissions 
reductions, although carbon trading has tended to be more politically popular and therefore more widely 
implemented by governments around the world.  
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Organization: Disney  
Brief summary: In 2009, Disney started taxing its business units according to their proportional 
contribution to the company’s total direct carbon dioxide emissions footprint. The tax charged 
per business unit is calculated from the unit’s projected increase or decrease in carbon 
emissions over a five-year period. The tax remains in effect in 201330 and the company is 
currently working towards a goal of zero net direct greenhouse gas emissions.31 
 
Results: Money generated by the tax, which has ranged from $10-20 per ton, is placed in a 
“Climate Solutions Fund” that invests in offset projects around the globe. The Fund has been in 
existence since 2008. Offset investments are focused on forest restoration and protection 
projects and are made in partnership with major environmental organizations including 
Conservation International and the Nature Conservancy.32 The tax program has raised about 
$35 million to date and offsets purchased using the funds contributed to Disney reducing its net 
greenhouse gas footprint by half in 2012 relative to 2006.33 
 
 
IIIAii | Analogue: Shadow Pricing 
 
According to the European Commission,34 a “shadow price,” also known as the “accounting 
price” is “the opportunity cost of goods, generally different from actual market prices and from 
regulated tariffs, [which can be] used in project appraisal to reflect better the real costs of 
inputs to society, and the real benefits of the outputs.” Shadow pricing can be applied to both 
economic inputs and outputs.  Shadow prices are a means to include the externality costs of 
carbon emissions as a consideration when evaluating capital investments and long-term 
expenditures, thereby making carbon-intensive project alternatives less attractive investments.  
 
Organization: Shell 
Brief summary: Shell launched its carbon strategy in the late 1990s after determining that a 
carbon price would be a reality in some parts of the world in the near future, and that both 
climate change and the policy responses to it would materially affect Shell’s business. One pillar 
of the Shell strategy is to apply a shadow price of carbon during all new project evaluations.35 
The company adds a per-ton price of carbon dioxide to project costs based on emissions 
projections. The shadow price is set internally according to the company’s appetite for risk due 
to carbon and is re-evaluated as needed. The price is not set according to Shell’s assessment of 
the true cost of carbon, nor does it represent the company’s estimate of a future regulatory 
price on carbon. 
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Results: More than a decade after initial implementation of the carbon shadow price, Shell is 
stil l using this approach. The company has simplified the application of the price to use just one 
price of $40 per tonne, regardless of project location. Previously, the shadow price had 
different regional values based on regulatory context. Instead, the $40 price is now applied 
universally and sensitivity analyses are done to test the effect of the price on the decision to 
invest in a project or any associated emissions mitigation strategies.  
 
In our conversation with one of the leaders of Shell’s carbon strategy,36 we learned that the 
company has sought to simplify the price to make it more effective and clear as a management 
tool. Further, he believes that the shadow price has been effecti ve as a driver of investment in 
mitigation, as it has successfully incentivized mitigation activities up to the cost of $40 per 
tonne. The shadow price has also made some investments sufficiently unattractive that Shell 
did not undertake the project at all.37 
 
Organization: Google 
Brief summary: In 2007, Google announced a new carbon shadow price to be used when 
evaluating power purchase costs for new data centers.38 The intent is to calculate a more 
accurate cost of power, particularly when conducting site s election.  In anticipation of carbon 
regulation, by applying a shadow price Google is reducing the financial risk inherent in carbon-
intensive energy investments, which may become more expensive in the future. Carbon 
shadow pricing puts renewable energy on a more level playing field. 39 
 
Results:  Google applies a shadow price to its power purchase agreement (PPA) cost analyses. 
The usual 20-year l ife of a PPA creates significant uncertainty as to what the energy market will 
look like over the life of a contract. Google has chosen to purchase wind-generated renewable 
energy as one way to lock-in a known power price and avoid a future cost of carbon emissions. 
Google evaluates the PPA over its lifetime using a price of carbon that ranges from $50 to $200 
per ton.40 Adding this shadow price makes the renewable PPA a more attractive investment 
than it would otherwise appear without assuming a future price of carbon. By signing long-term 
PPAs, Google helps to bring new renewable energy sources online by providing a guaranteed 
customer and helping to assume much of the risk of constructing a wind farm.41 
 
 
IIIAiii | Lessons Learned 
 
Experiments with internal carbon pricing schemes have had mixed environmental and financial 
results. What is consistent across all the pricing schemes is an attempt to incorporate 
externality costs to give a more complete picture of the true cost of operations. The use of this 
 20 
price varies from understanding the cost that future external markets may impose to estimating 
the value of the risk of emissions-intensive operations. While Disney and Microsoft, can place a 
specific number on the amount of money generated by their policies, it is harder to tell if and 
how Google and Shell are able to quantify success. In theory, they could quantify the total value 
of investment dollars influenced by their respective shadow prices or how many tons of 
emissions have been prevented by changing one project type to another  or undertaking 
mitigation activities as a result of the shadow price. However, with or without a number the 
most notable impact of a pricing scheme appears to be the change in mindset that comes with 
assigning value to a previously unvalued environmental cost.  
 
Microsoft states, “Even as we developed our strategy, the initial discussions within our 
company have already served as a catalyst for driving deeper dialogue and analyses that should 
result in improved efficiencies and more sustainable practices.”42 The company also cites 
desired indirect impact on employee engagement, consumer goodwill and attention to 
products l ike its carbon management tool. Similarly, Disney’s use of a carbon tax as a focusing, 
rather than just a marketing, tool is evidenced by the fact that though internal carbon efforts 
began in 2006, the internal tax was not publicly revealed till 2009.43 The ripple effects within 
the organization go beyond the Conservation Fund to the introduction of alternative fuel 
vehicles, retrofits to Resort trains to run on Disney restaurant-sourced biodiesel, l ighting 
upgrades and data center efficiency.44  One major difference between the funds is that the 
Microsoft charge is applied per ton of carbon and the Disney fee is a proportional amount of 
the total that the company decides to puts into the Conservation Fund. Microsoft business units 
therefore have clearer incentives to make incremental carbon emissions reductions, meaning 
that employee behavior change is more likely to be seen at lower levels. The difference 
highlights that the value of an externality monetization mechanism i s best viewed through a 
comprehensive lens of the proposed policy’s impact not only on carbon but also on 




IIIAiv | Application to the Corporate and Water Context 
 
Though no previous cases of internal taxing or fees or shadow pricing applied to water were 
found, the team feels that pricing schemes have high potential for successful application across 
a variety of corporate contexts to address water challenges. Though the price on natural 
resources can be subjective and difficult to define, once chosen, a price can be fairly easily 
inserted into existing corporate accounting systems and processes. There are also precedents 
beyond carbon in transfer pricing and other areas not explored by this paper that can serve as 
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guides as to how to implement a price on eco-externalities or corporate risk. In general, a 
shadow price is operationally simpler to put into practice than is a fee system. Whereas a water 
tax would involve deployment of management systems to track water consumption and apply 
the fee at a decision-relevant level, shadow pricing at the investment phase would be applied 
based on proposed alternative investments estimated to use or impact water resources in 
different manners. Because no retroactive measurement or fee collection takes place, the 
planning and implementation burden across the organization of a shadow pricing policy is much 
lower. 
 
That said, applying either pricing either scheme to water would be somewhat more complex 
than it is with carbon. Of the major differences between water and carbon discussed in this 
paper’s introduction, the differences most relevant to pricing are localized value and uncertain 
future availability.  Unlike carbon emissions, water does not have the same value across 
locations in terms of either value per volume or value per level of quality. In other words, while 
a single carbon price can exist across a multi-national firm, water values are most appropriate 
at a watershed or basin level. Further, carbon dioxide has similar impact and therefore 
externality cost anywhere, whereas water comes in different qualities and relative quantities, 
affecting its local ecosystem or use value. In addition, although it is not easy to predict future 
carbon market prices, it is even more uncertain what future value should be placed on water in 
different settings. Unlike carbon emissions, which are largely tied to fossil fuel consumption and 
its economic drivers, seasonal and climatic variability make future water availability, and 
therefore value, extremely difficult to forecast.  
 
The first implication for firms is that an internal water price would have to be set to multiple 
values in different geographies depending on the characteristics of the local water supply and 
how the firm uses water as a resource. For example, a manufacturing company like Dow with 
water-intense operations in a few key sites could potentially set a shadow price for future 
investments at major manufacturing sites according to the level of water scarcity at any 
particular site. A more disperse retail organization with a l ighter water footprint might find it 
more useful to implement a common water use fee to incentivize individual stores to install 
rainwater catchment systems or widely applicable water efficiency technologies.  
 
The second implication is that the actions generated by a tax or shadow price would have to be 
much more closely tied to the local area to achieve an ecologically relevant impact. For example, 
were a water tax system extended to the Microsoft model, whereby tax revenues are used to 
offset the environmental impact, water “offsets” funded by the tax would need to take place 
within the same basin. Funding “payments for ecosystem services” (PES) projects, which are 
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discussed in Theme 4 of this paper, would be one potential way to use such funds to achieve 
something like the water equivalent of carbon neutrality.  
 
Finally, because water availability and scarcity are difficult to predict on an annual and multi-
year basis, prioritizing water-based investments based on highly uncertain estimated future 
availability would add another layer of complexity. In Theme 4: Preparing for an Uncertain 
Future, various analogues that could supplement a water fee to help organizations deal with 




IIIB | Theme 2: Allocating Resources & Prioritizing Projects 
 
How to allocate resources for and prioritize potential courses of action is a related but distinct 
challenge to valuing and pricing ecosystem impacts. A price allows quantitative comparison of 
various courses of action and provides a basis for incorporating action into established 
budgeting and operational procedures. However, it is not always easy to gather sufficient 
information or make all the calculations necessary to determine a price, let alone the most 
efficient or feasible course of action. In addition, in large decentralized organizations, there is 
often a lack of authority or capacity to take actions at the local level. This section describes 
three different allocation and prioritization mechanisms—internal trading schemes, green 
infrastructure portfolio standards and infrastructure management incentives – that are 
designed to help organizations overcome these challenges of effectively using a price to guide 
action. 
 
Internal trading schemes are one way to allow more decentralized distribution of responsibility 
for addressing natural resource issues by letting different business units or departments use a 
market-like system to make decisions about their individual action plans. In addition, trading in  
a credit system could have the advantage of skipping the pricing challenge all together by 
letting the internal “market” effectively set the price for the company. Experiments with 
internal trading mechanisms by Royal Dutch Shell (Shell) and British Petroleum (BP) are used to 
explore the opportunities and challenges of using trading at a corporate level.   
 
Green infrastructure portfolio standards (GIPS) are another way to allocate responsibility across 
a decentralized constituency that similar to trading schemes, allow for an overall goal to be 
reached in a flexible manner. The work of the Center for Neighborhood Technology in Chicago 
is used as an example case of how GIPS, which are an infrastructure-based version of the more 
common Renewable Energy Standard, can be used to scale up investments in sustainability in a 
cost-effective manner.  
 
Finally, the case of a stormwater reduction incentive program instituted by the City of 
Philadelphia is used to illustrate the use of incentives to encourage behavior change in home 
and business owners without prescriptive or mandatory action. The least restrictive allocation 
mechanism described in this section, the Philadelphia program seeks to set the right conditions 






IIIBi | Analogue: Internal Trading 
 
Natural Resource Challenge: How to allocate and prioritize financial investments by evaluating 
competing courses of action with the inclusion of the cost of carbon.  
 
Organization: Shell 
Brief summary: Shell Oil started its cap and trade system in 2000 with a three-year pilot internal 
trading program run by the Environmental Health and Safety group within the Corporate Affairs 
department. The goal of the Shell Tradable Emissions Permit System (STEPS) was to reduce 
emissions of participating units by two percent below 1998 levels using declining caps on 
permit allocations. Participation in STEPS was voluntary, and participating units accounted for 
70 percent of Shell’s emissions in Annex 1 countries, as defined by the Kyoto Protocol. 
Allocation of permits was based on each unit’s emissions history. A concurrent initiative setting 
a shadow price on carbon when evaluating future investments, which is discussed in the Carbon 
Pricing section of this report, supported the trading system and is still in use in spite of the 
termination of the cap and trade program.45  
 
Results:  The STEPS pilot was only partially successful. Shell failed to meet its emissions 
reduction and financial goals under the program, but it did gain valuable experience that 
allowed it to participate in shaping external carbon markets.  According to Shell, STEPS failed to 
meet the targets for three reasons: First, participation in STEPS was voluntary. Units that could 
easily reduce emissions chose to participate and units that would bear a high cost for reducing 
emissions did not. The result was an artificially low permit value that was not substantial 
enough to incentivize business units to take action. Second, units in different countries could 
not monetize trades for tax liability reasons, making it hard to effectively put credits into use. 
Third, halfway through the pilot, some participating units asked for and received extra permits, 
further weakening the utility of the internal market by lowering prices even more and reducing 
overall liquidity.46   
 
But as a learning tool, the program gave Shell experience in carbon trading prior to entry into 
external carbon markets and generated awareness throughout the company as to the 
importance of carbon reductions.47 After the STEPS experiment, Shell shifted its trading focus 
from internal to external at the end of 2001 with the creation of the carbon desk within Shell 
Trading.48 Shell was an early participant in the Danish and UK carbon trading programs prior to 






Brief summary: BP was the first oil company to publicly recognize the threat of climate change 
in a speech by CEO John Brown at Stanford in 1997.50  When BP set up its own internal carbon 
trading system, the first in the industry, its goals were threefold. First, it wanted to gain 
experience that might be useful were an external market to develop. Second, it wanted to show 
that the trading method would be less costly than a potential carbon tax in reducing emissions, 
and third, it wanted to find the most efficient way of reducing emissions across business units.51 
In contrast to the Shell method of implementation, BP chose one representative from each 
business unit to oversee trading rather than centralizing the responsibility within the 
Environmental Health and Safety function. Managers also had access to a $25 million capital 
fund that was dedicated for investment in emissions reduction projects.52 The three-year 
program ran from 1999 through 2001. All business units globally were included in the 
mandatory program. There were real rewards for those that achieved targets.53  
 
Results: The target of reducing emissions by 10 percent relative to the 1990 baseline was 
achieved seven years early in 2001, with a net savings to the company of $600 million.54 Despite 
this success, BP still ended the internal trading program in 2001 with the start of trading on 
external European carbon markets. 
 
 
IIIBii | Analogue: Green Infrastructure Portfolio Standards 
 
Natural Resource Challenge: How to guide allocation of financial investments to support 
environmentally beneficial projects when those environmental projects do not compete as 
strongly for capital as traditional projects.  
 
Organization: Center for Neighborhood Technology 
Brief summary: The Center for Neighborhood Technology, a 34-year old Chicago-based 
organization focused on urban sustainability, developed and is currently testing a green 
infrastructure portfolio standard (GIPS), which seeks to leverage the recent success of state-
based renewable energy portfolio standards and apply them to stormwater management. The 
overall intent is to push cities to scale up investments in green infrastructure in a cost effective 
manner that ultimately reduces the volume of stormwater runoff into the sewer system.  The 
basic idea is that a certain portion of infrastructure investments must be in infrastructure that 
meets designated “green” criteria. The portion of overall investment is calculated based on the 
amount it would take to create the aggregate desired impact. Thus each person responsible for 
making investment decisions has leeway for deciding where and how to spend the portion of 
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the portfolio that must meet the criteria, but the centralized goal is still achieved. This program 
is currently being tested in two cities – Grand Rapids, Michigan and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 
 
Results:  Although neither Grand Rapids nor Milwaukee GIPS’s have produced a financial return 
as yet, the financial benefits of green infrastructure versus grey infrastructure have been 
realized in other instances across the country.55  
 
Grand Rapids is in the process of piloting GIPS on a 200-acre plot of mixed-use land that lies 
within a single drainage area, where progress can be easily tracked. Grand Rapids is not unlike 
other urban areas where the likelihood of new development or redevelopment is rather low. As 
a result, the success of this GIPS pilot and others relies on the city’s ability to make small 
improvements over long periods of time. In Grand Rapids, the Department of Environmental 
Services has committed to a one percent reduction in runoff volume each year over a ten-year 
period. During the first year of operation, the city plans to achieve this reduction through a 
combination of porous pavement projects, a rain barrel program for individual households, and 
parkway rain gardens.56   
 
Milwaukee is currently at an earlier stage in the process, having just identified two target 
watersheds with historical issues of flooding. The city is now in the process of identifying the 
baseline runoff volume and potential green infrastructure investment projects to meet the (yet 
to be established) stormwater volume reduction targets.57 
 
 
IIIBiii | Analogue: Infrastructure Management Incentives 
 
Natural Resource Challenge: How to incentivize property and land management practices that 
reduce undesirable stormwater runoff. 
 
Organization: City of Philadelphia 
Brief summary: Prior to the summer of 2010, Philadelphia assessed a stormwater fee to all 
commercial properties based on property size. In July 2010, the Philadelphia Water Department 
switched from assessing stormwater fees based on lot size to charging based on a ratio of 
pervious to impervious surface. The change created an incentive for homeowners to maximize 
pervious surface and minimize runoff-causing infrastructure.  The new policy applies to all 
public and private landowners except residential buildings with four or fewer units.58  It is being 
phased in over the course of four years, as the fee transitions from 100 percent meter-based to 
100 percent parcel-based by July 2013.59  Impervious surface area on large parcels of land are 
calculated using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) tools, while smaller parcels are 
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calculated using a standard 85 percent impervious area for developed properties and 25 
percent for undeveloped sites. This means that an average property with 10,000 square feet of 
impervious surface would experience a stormwater fee of around $100 per month. Fees were 
determined by calculating the total stormwater fee requirements, mapping the total gross and 
impervious surface area, and attributing a revenue multiplier to each (20 percent for gross area, 
80 percent for impervious area). Ultimately, this created a program that was revenue neutral.60 
 
To encourage property owners to adopt better water management practices and to reward 
those that already implemented such practices, the City of Philadelphia approved a variety of 
credits and incentives to facilitate change in response to the new stormwater policy. For 
example, an Impervious Area Credit to defray costs of higher stormwater fees can be earned by 
developing a stormwater management plan that manages the first inch of runoff from an 
impervious area on a site.61 A Green Roof Tax Credit incentivizes green roof construction 
through a Department of Revenue program that subsidizes 25 percent of the cost to install a 
green roof up to $100,000, applied against Philadelphia’s Business Privilege Tax liability.62 
Significantly, not all incentives are monetary in nature. New property development on sites 
over 15,000 square feet that reduces connected impervious surface area by 20% percent or 
more can effectively decrease permitting time by getting waived from Flood Control and 
Channel Protection requirements.63  
 
Results:  Parcel management incentives created by stormwater fees are now more clearly 
aligned with the root cause of the stormwater problem. However, it is too early to tell  how this 
new policy will affect stormwater trends in Philadelphia for several reasons. First, at the time of 
writing, parcel-based billing was still in the process of implementation.64 Second, businesses 
likely to experience the greatest impact from the policy shift are the same businesses with the 
greatest inertia. These businesses own vast parcels of land representing large capital 
investments, and the decision to implement stormwater reduction measures will require a 
significant amount of consideration. Finally, climatic patterns create significant variation in 
rainfall from year to year. Decades of data will need to be collected before any reduction trend 
is visible.  
 
In the short term, proponents and advocates of the policy have brought up several possible 
secondary impacts of the stormwater policy. Since the property owner is ultimately responsible 
for paying the stormwater fee, the change is expected to increase some property values while 
decreasing others due to changes in expected long-term operating costs. Private, non-
residential parcels are expected to experience a $190 million decrease in value leading to an 
estimated decrease of $3.9 million in property tax revenue.65 Overall, the change in property 
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tax revenue will be minimal, since a number of sites will increase in value due to decreased 
stormwater fees.66  
 
 
IIIBiv | Lessons Learned 
 
A number of lessons can be learned from the Allocating Resources & Prioritizing Projects 
analogues. First, as will be discussed again in many analogues, all the initiatives had high-level 
support from organizational leaders that allowed for adoption and implementation. 
 
Second, the cases demonstrate the importance of ensuring effective implementation once the 
decision to go forward with the initiative has been made. Beyond the basic challenge of 
deciding which outcomes to prioritize, the arguably greater challenge is getting the designated 
business units or parties to execute the des ired action. Different methods of ensuring action 
differ in the degree of flexibility in who makes decisions and what methods are used. 
 
The two trading examples are both very decentralized in terms of who makes decisions and in 
specifying what actions are to be taken to achieve desired outcomes. However, as a comparison 
of the two trading program shows, a lack of accountability is counterproductive. One of the 
primary reasons identified for failure of the STEPS program at Shell was the voluntary nature of 
the program. In contrast, reasons that BP cited as contributing to program success included 
mandatory participation, as well as business unit input in creating a flexible, appropriate system 
design, transparent reporting of results and enforcement of stated penalties for non-
compliance.67  
 
The GIPS programs in Milwaukee and Grand Rapids ensured implementation by giving 
centralized decision-making authority to a smaller set of people. However, this group of people 
had great leeway in deciding how to go about meeting overall standards.  At the other end of 
the spectrum, Philadelphia’s stormwater incentives dictate the exact action desired, but leaves 
the decision-maker role completely unspecified and voluntary. At its core, the system is a 
method of incentivizing, without mandating, a desired management action by changing the 
cost-benefit analysis for property managers. The “business unit” in this case is the residential 
lot and the “manager” is each landowner. The system is at once more specific than the previous 
two analogues in that it designates both the exact place and type of desired action, but at the 
same time less prescriptive because there is no obligation for action on the part of any single 
lot owner.  
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Second, the allocation and prioritization theme reveals the significance of sustainability 
initiatives to development of future strategy and for preparation for potential future external 
environmental markets. Shell used the internal pilot trading system as a way to influence the 
design of its first carbon desk within Shell Trading in 2001 and to prepare itself for a probable 
future external carbon market, which eventually did begin in 2003.68 Shell has since maintained 
its status a first mover in the space by making the first trade in California’s new cap and trade 
carbon market on August 29, 2011.69 Using the credibility gained through demonstrable 
internal action, both Shell and BP were able to be active participants in the debate on design of 
external markets.  
 
The GIPS and Philadelphia stormwater initiatives are both precedents for greater use of green 
infrastructure and more broadly, for innovative realignment of policy incentives to promote 
actions which contribute to both financial and environmental goals. All three are good 
examples of how addressing current natural resource challenges can bring together multiple 
stakeholders in new arrangements and partnerships, an experience which can then be 
leveraged in other areas.  
 
 
IIIBv | Application to the Corporate and Water Context 
 
Because allocation of responsibility for and prioritization of projects is in many ways at the 
heart of program design and execution, the lessons learned from the analogues in this theme 
have an array of applications in corporations and to water management. Existing corporate 
accounting, resource sharing or investment guidelines and incentives could be adapted to 
implement trading, portfolio standard or resource use incentives related to water use. Like any 
case of water management, special consideration would have to be given to the local, non-
fungible nature of water as a resource. For example, an internal trading scheme would likely 
have to be scaled to a basin-level cross-business unit credit system in order to be meaningful. 
Portfolio standard and use incentives, however, could be more flexibly applied (e.g., a 
requirement that a percent of annual capital expenditures be “green;” or reduced internal 
transfer rates for certain resources if water efficiency improvements are made) to centrally 
promote sustainable action while allowing for local prioritization of best use. 
 
In spite of the difficulties of measurement and tracking, substitutability and uncertainty, the 
real challenge of applying the analogues in this, or any, of the themes is one of commitment. 
Corporations must recognize the importance of water and prioritize sustainable water use in 
operations and corporate strategy. Though many corporations recognize water issues, few are 
dedicating substantial human and monetary resources to address them. In some cases, this is 
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not due to a lack of desire, but to financing systems and rules designed for very different 
purposes that can be barriers to project financing. Unlike the Center for Neighborhood 
Technology, which received Environmental Protection Agency funding for its GIPS program, or 
the City of Philadelphia, which as a public sector entity has a more flexible set of policy setting 
justifications, corporations have to find ways of reallocating or raising money that has 
traditionally gone to uses aimed to maximize shareholder value in the near term. Analogues 
that exemplify different ways that corporations have overcome this financial challenge are 
explored in Theme 3. 
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IIIC | Theme 3: Financing Projects  
 
Even if corporations are able to overcome the challenges of valuing and prioritizing responses 
to natural resource challenges, the unusual nature of some environmental mitigation projects 
often presents the added difficulty of trying to secure dedicated or supplemental internal or 
external financing to implement the chosen response. This section examines different ways that 
institutions have tried to overcome various project financing barriers, from access to external 
capital to inclusion in ongoing budgeting and workarounds for inflexible project approval 
hurdles.  
 
Some of the most common examples for overcoming environmental project financing 
challenges are found in energy efficiency projects. Energy efficiency projects are often ideal 
candidates for innovative external and internal project financing because although they face 
many of the common barriers to financing, they often have high rates of return and quick 
payback periods that make crossing these barriers easier to justify. A high initial capital outlay 
requirement can be a barrier to project development when competing for a slice of budgets 
that are typically focused on continued operations and can allocate only l imited funds to new 
capital investments.70 Johnson Controls, Inc. (Johnson Controls), a  leading provider of 
equipment and services for building energy and security systems, has developed financing 
solutions that make investing in energy efficiency more accessible as part of the set of services 
they offer to their customers. The Harvard Revolving Fund is an example of a financing solution 




IIICi | Analogue: Energy Efficiency Financing 
 
Natural Resource Challenge: Electricity and utility costs can be a significant portion of operating 
costs for many corporations. The projects required to address energy consumption via 
efficiency upgrades may face difficulty securing internal or external financing.  
 
Organization: Johnson Controls 
Brief summary:  Energy efficiency renovations and upgrades are crucial as energy prices rise, 
but major such upgrades are capital intensive.  High capital costs make them attractive to put 
off as institutions, property owners, and others leave the financing for a later budget cycle or 
another person to tackle.  Upgrades designed to reduce future costs, such as energy retrofits, 
must compete with immediate maintenance demands for limited budget allocations. The 
discrepancy in perceived urgency of maintenance, growth or environmental mitigation projects 
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is a matter of perspective that is closely related to valuation discussed in Theme 1 and which 
often compounds the financing challenge. 
 
As Johnson Controls has developed its portfolio of energy efficiency service offerings, it has 
developed several ways to help its customers finance these projects. Table 2 provides a 
summary of six of these options. 
 




Effective when long-term tenant occupies all or most of a large building. 
The owner of the building passes the cost of energy retrofits on to the large 
tenant through an adjustment to leasing terms.  Energy bill savings derived 
by the tenant offset this additional leasing expense. This arrangement 
allows the building owner to overcome the financing hurdle that the owner 
must pay retrofits while the tenant is the entity reaping the savings from a 




This type of off-balance sheet financing enables a building owner to benefit 
from energy retrofit savings without any initial capital expenditure. Rather 
than enter a performance type of agreement with the building owner, the 
energy services company (ESCO) sells a portfolio of energy retrofits with 
guaranteed savings to a third party ownership company (OwCo). The 
building owner then remits a pre-determined percentage of the energy 
savings directly to the OwCo (typically 80 – 90 percent) as payment for 
taking on the risk and capital expenditure of the investment. At the 
conclusion of the SSA contract (typically 10 – 12 years), the building owner 




Through a PPA, a business enters a long term contract to purchase 
renewable energy or heated or chilled water (generated by either a high 
efficiency heating or cooling plant) from a contracting firm.. The contracting 
firm pays the up-front costs for installation as well as the ongoing costs for 




Clean Energy (PACE) 
Bonds74 
 
PACE Bonds were created as a mechanism to encourage energy retrofits by 
circumventing potential barriers caused by building ownership structure. 
PACE bonds fund energy efficiency retrofits and renewable energy projects 
through long term (20 years) financing assessed through the property tax 
bill. This ensures that the tax lien remains in place even in the case of a 
change in ownership, making it significantly more attractive to potential 
lenders.   
Green Leases75 
 
Seeking to address the conflict in incentives between the building owner, 
who is responsible for making capital improvements and tenants, who are 
responsible for paying the electricity bill, green leases use three techniques 
to incentivize tenants to conserve energy and water amongst other green 
building practices: 
- Triple-net lease: requires the tenant to pay for all taxes, maintenance, and 
util ity expenses for the property in addition to monthly rent. This effectively 
shifts the burden of capital improvements and incentivizes the tenant to 
prioritize energy efficiency when making improvements, because the tenant 
can realize the benefits of these investments over the lease term. 
- Sub-metering: ensures individual tenants are directly responsible for the 
water and energy they use, thus discouraging excess consumption 
- Capital cost pass-through: owners have the right to pass on to tenants the 
capital costs that result in operational savings. Since the tenants pay the 





Under this all-encompassing agreement, an energy service company (ESCO) 
assumes responsibility for all building operations and financial and 
operating risk for an extended period of time. This type of agreement was 
created to allow companies to focus entirely on their core competency, 
while “outsourcing” all construction and operations to an ESCO that is 
qualified and financially incentivized to ensure energy efficiency is 
considered at each stage in the process.  
 
Results:  Since 2000, Johnson Controls’ energy efficiency solutions have reduced carbon dioxide 
emissions by over 13.6 million metric tons. In addition, they have generated over $7.5 billion in 
savings for their customers.77  These financing mechanisms allow customers of Johnson 




IIICii | Analogue: Green Revolving Funds 
 
Green Revolving Funds (GRFs) are a return-oriented investment vehicle that results in both 
financial and environmental benefits.78  GRFs invest in energy efficiency enhancements and 
decreased resource use, which in turn reduce operating expenses.79  The cost savings from the 
decreased operating expenditures pay back the GRF’s initial investment allowing for 
reinvestment in the next wave of energy efficiency upgrades.80 Payback periods for projects 
funded by the Harvard fund range from one to 10 years, at an average of four years.81 
 
Natural Resource Challenge: How to make the case to invest in environmental projects when 
payback time horizons are often longer-term and returns on investment can be lower relative 
to other investment options.  A dedicated funding pool creates a financing opportunity and can 
allow room to consider non-traditional investment objectives, such as reducing environmental 
impacts.   
 
Organization: Harvard Revolving Fund 
Brief summary: Harvard’s Green Revolving Fund was founded in 1993 with an initial allocation 
of $1.5 million.82  The purpose of this fund was to make investment dollars available to s pecific 
projects that saved energy or reduced environmental impact and were projected to save the 
university money in the long run.  This first iteration of Harvard’s revolving fund had an annual 
average savings of $880,000 with an annual ROI of 34 percent. 83 Though disbanded in 1998, 
the Green Loan Fund (GLF) reemerged in 2001 as a $3 million revolving fund endowed out of 
the central administrative budget.84  The success of the fund is reflected in the fact that the 
University increased the endowment to $6 million in 2004 and then doubled it again in 2006 to 
$12 million in order to be able to finance more projects.85  The range of projects the Fund could 
finance expanded in 2007 with an incremental loan offering that funded the cost difference 
between “base code and sustainable design” of buildings using a l ife cycle cost analysis.86   This 
means that a building built using sustainable rather than conventional construction practices 
would receive an incremental loan to finance the green design premium, which is often seen as 
a barrier for property owners. 
 
Results:  Harvard’s revolving loan fund has made a significant impact on investments.  The 
average project payback period for GLF-funded projects is three years, with an average return 
on investment of 29.9 percent.  Aggregate savings over the 2001-2010 period total $4.8 
million.87  Environmental outcomes include88 reducing emissions by 217.7 million pounds CO2-
equivalent, saving 57.47 million gallons of water, and reducing solid waste generation by 1.2 
million pounds.  Furthermore, as an educational institution, energy efficiency and “green” 
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projects also have an impact by illustrating to  the university community that green projects are 
not only feasible, but also improve the bottom line.  
 
 
IIICiii | Lessons Learned 
 
Securing financing for environmental projects with longer payback periods and lower returns 
on investment can be challenging.  However, as shown by the Johnson Controls and Harvard 
studies, there are financing tools available that can mitigate this shortcoming.  What is 
consistent across the Johnson Controls energy efficiency performance contract financing and 
the Harvard Green Loan Fund is reducing the capital and debt burden of the project for the 
implementing organization.  To set up a revolving fund, a one-time commitment of capital is 
required to create a funding source that will be self-perpetuating if managed wisely.  Once this 
initial financial commitment is made, the need for sustainability projects to compete with other 
funding priorities is eliminated.  Similarly, with EEPCs, the need for ongoing capital investment 
is minimized through off-balance sheet financing and external means to raise capital.   
 
EEPCs and other project financing services transfer the investment risks on to those who are 
experts in energy efficiency technology, and transfer the returns to more patient investors 
willing to accept a longer time horizon for payback.  Revolving funds a re a self-sustaining source 
that guarantees capital for special projects that would otherwise not successfully compete for 
financing resources.  Ultimately, these approaches to financing projects make sustainability 
investments possible by creating an alternative avenue to source capital.  However, 
organizations may have constraints that limit their ability to take advantage of such financing 
schemes.  For example, accounting policies that allow for off-balance sheet financing and that 
accommodate tracking the rollover pool of money must be in place.  This was not the case at 
least one of the organizations consulted during the course of this project, in which case there is 
an organizational policy in place that prohibits deriving benefits from an asset that is not 
accounted for on the balance sheet.  
 
 
IIICiv | Application to the Corporate and Water Context 
 
Given the variety of financing projects analogues, there are several applications to corporate 
water management. For starters, a revolving fund could be dedicated strictly to water projects 
that are self-sustained based on savings generated from reduced water purchasing or 
processing and usage costs.  The fund could be dedicated to one business unit or set up by a 
central office in order to be accessible across the company. Another application of a revolving 
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fund could be to broaden the criteria to be a comprehensive sustainability fund with a potential  
portfolio standard that ensures at least a certain level of investment in water projects, despite 
their low return relative to energy projects.  Other types of sustainability projects in the fund 
portfolio, including energy efficiency projects, could provide the return on investment needed 
to keep the fund alive.  This “bundled” approach can help the portfolio achieve a target internal 
hurdle rate of return. 
 
Performance contracting is a more challenging analogue to apply because projects that strictly 
involve water may not provide a return sufficient to attract third-party investors.  However, 
contracting with a partner could be mutually beneficial as companies have varying costs of 
capital.  A larger company may be willing to enter into a 10-15 year purchasing agreement for 
water provision or purification projects, given its ability to take such a long-term view.   
 
Under anchor tenant financing, a corporate-driven water leasing entity could be created to 
disburse water to various business divisions within a particular location, with the “anchor 
tenant” being identified as the business process or division who uses the most water at a site.  
By adjusting the leasing terms upward for the “anchor tenant,” funds could be generated to 
finance water efficiency investments, which would enable additional cost savings to offset the 
increased leasing costs.  However, this could be challenging as there is often times no single 
user of any allotment of process water, making it difficult to equitably identify the “anchor 
tenant.”  Manufacturing corporations vary widely from the traditional retail space that can 
better implement this type of anchor tenant arrangement. 
 
With a shared savings agreement, a water-focused third party ownership company could be 
created to provide capital to fund water efficiency projects.  This ownership company could 
centrally manage all water-related assets and ensure that efficiency investments are made 
strategically on a global basis, without burdening individual sites or divisions with the 
requirement for large capital expenditures and additional debt.  As the ownership company 
receives payment from divisions for the savings achieved, the funds could be re-invested in 
other areas of the business – similar to a revolving fund approach.  However, unlike building 
management systems, which are generally standardized, water efficiency measures can vary 
between water applications, business divisions and manufacturing sites, making it difficult to 
centralize the function, while maintaining required expertise. 
 
Power purchase agreements are already being applied to water in the form of contractor-
supplied high efficiency heating and cooling plants. However, this too relies on third party 
contractors and could be difficult to implement internally in an organization. 
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Property-assessed clean energy bonds are growing in popularity across the country as a means 
to improve energy efficiency, primarily of commercial properties.  However, the PACE financing 
model  was designed primarily to fund energy efficiency retrofits and small renewable energy 
projects, and it does not specifically address water efficiency. Consequently, PACE bond 
legislation would need to be expanded before this concept could be applied to water in the 
corporate context. 
 
Green leases could be applied to water by treating all business divisions as individual lessees of 
water.  Using triple-net leasing, one could assign a cost to water resources at a site level and 
then push that cost down to each division to incentivize water efficiency at that level.  Sub-
metering could be used to ensure divisions are directly responsible for the water and energy 
they use, thus discouraging excess usage.  However, as discussed in the pricing theme, 
developing a price of water could be a significant undertaking in a large organization. Further, 
tracing water usage for sub-metering is made complex by the many industrial systems that use 
water multiple times over or that use water in both consumptive and non-consumptive ways. 
 
Performance-based infrastructure could be used by creating an internal group that manages all 
construction, operations and maintenance of water resources, and is fully responsible for the 
budgets that relate to the acquisition and delivery of water.  However, separating water -
specific construction and operations from currently existing capital budgeting and facilities 






IIID | Theme 4: Preparing for an Uncertain Future  
 
The last set of analogues is tied together by an orientation towards mitigating the risk of an 
uncertain future. Risk management is present in the other analogues discussed, as climatic and 
regulatory uncertainty are inherent in all sustainability challenges, but the following three 
analogues are particularly focused on providing flexible response mechanisms for the 
protection of future resources. Payments for environmental services (PES) are perhaps the best 
known of the three. In their basic form, they are payments to or incentives for landowners to 
take certain conservation actions on their property that enhance desired ecosystem services 
(e.g. freshwater provision). PES systems have gained significant traction among government 
and non-profit entities, but corporate participation in PES markets is still nascent. Habitat 
conservation banking is another analogue that has achieved significant results in government-
established pilot studies, but as of yet had little use in the private sector. Finally, portfolio 
theory for conservation is an exciting, but untested idea devised by a set of researchers in 
Indiana.  
 
Although all the analogues that have been described are somewhat experimental in their focus 
and application, this last set of analogues would initiate decidedly more adventurous paths for 
corporate adopters because they all require an even greater comfort with long-term views and 
uncertain outcomes.  
 
 
IIIDi | Analogue: Modern Portfolio Theory 
 
Natural Resource Challenge: How to prioritize which habitats and watersheds to preserve and 
conserve to ultimately manage for maximum diversity and water availability. 
 
Organization: University of Illinois 
Overview: Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) is a standard tool for reducing financial risk. 
Increasingly, conservationists and scholars are exploring the possibility of using MPT to address 
climate change-related risk and uncertainty. Researchers at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign applied MPT to optimize spatial targeting (i.e., to better select priority areas) for 
conservation activities in the Prairie Pothole Region (PPR)c of the US. Using MPT, they were able 
to determine the allocation that would maximize conservation returns for a given level of 
uncertainty or minimize uncertainty for a given expected level of returns.89   
                                                   
c The US portion of the Prairie Pothole Region includes portions of Montana, North Dakota South Dakota, 
Minnesota and Iowa. Although not considered in the study, the PPR also extends into Canada.  
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MPT is adapted to conservation by using spatial covariance of ecological conditions to target 
specific conservation and restoration investments.  The case study was conducted on the 64-
million acre US portion of the PPR, a key breeding ground for many migratory birds. The Fish 
and Wildlife Service hopes to quadruple the acreage of protected lands in the region, with a 
starting base of just over three million acres. 
 
The authors divided the PPR into three sub-regions and analyzed habitat quality and average 
conservation costs per acre under three different potential future climate scenarios. They then 
assigned a probability to each scenario and used MPT to find the most efficient land portfolio 
from a pure benefit analysis and from a cost-benefit perspective. In other words, they find the 
portfolio with the highest expected habitat quality or the highest quality per dollar investment 
for a given amount of risk.  
 
More common methods of diversification select for diverse biophysical or climatic 
characteristics (currently or in a future climate scenario), but do not include covariance of 
ecological outcomes. In contrast, MPT uses joint probability distribution (means, variances, 
covariances) of outcomes on all possible assets to select the portfolio that most efficiently 
manages risk. For example, in this study, the Eastern sub-region is expected to do better, or 
retain more biodiversity, when the Central sub-region is expected to relatively poorly. In other 
words, the Eastern and Central sub regions are negatively correlated. Depending on the climate 
scenario, shifting conservation investment from one of these areas to the other reduces risk. 
 
Results:  The PPR study found that current conservation investments are surprisingly efficient in 
the “no climate change” scenario, but much less efficient in a climate-changed future. Using 
weighted probabilities of each climate scenario, the team found that MPT, relative to simple 
diversification, would result in 15 percent higher conservation value per dollar spent for the 
same level of risk, 21 percent less uncertainty over the benefits of conservation investments 
and six percent greater benefits.90   
 
As the study is theoretical, it remains to be seen how the US Fish and Wildlife Service and other 
organizations will respond to the results. However, the authors do see significant potential for 
MPT to be used to reduce uncertainty of future ecosystem service benefits from land policy and 




IIIDii | Analogue: Payments for Ecosystem Services  
 
Natural Resource Challenge: How to develop incentives sufficient to persuade landowners to 
take action to conserve natural habitats for a desired environmental management outcome. 
 
Organization: SABMiller 
Overview: In 2008, SABMiller partnered with The Nature Conservancy (TNC) to create a water 
fund aimed at protecting water quality for both business and the eight million residents in 
Bogota who are provided water by the Chingaza and Sumapaz national parks.91 In this system, 
downstream buyers pay into a fund that goes on to subsidize the implementation and use of 
watershed best management practices. Buyers include municipalities, water treatment facilities, 
government agencies and private corporations. Transactions are voluntary and are performed 
under the expectation that payment into the fund will generate long term returns in the form 
of better watershed health and corresponding increases in water availability and quality. 
SABMiller has 6 breweries and 5 bottling facilities spread throughout Columbia, and is thus 
directly concerned with the volume and quality of freshwater available.92 
 
The established water fund focuses on several initiatives that preserve water availability and 
quality: 
 
 Reforestation: Reforestation and re-vegetation efforts are critical to preventing erosion. 
Areas that have been deforested can be replanted to prevent further sedimentation 
while allowing for a return to a natural environmental state. 
 Higher Quality Cattle: Higher quality cattle produce more milk from fewer cows, 
reducing the need to create additional grazing land. Maintaining forested land leads to 
lower levels of sediment erosion than when land is converted to grazing.93 
 Park Rangers: Many TNC projects include training park rangers to support the national 
system in the hopes that a more educated ranger population will increase enforcement 
and decrease the overall number of acres harvested.94 
 Park Protection: Projects often include fencing off of headwaters and riparian areas to 
provide additional protection for ecologically sensitive areas. These are generally 
considered best management practices for payments for watershed services systems.95 
 Diversified Livelihoods: One strategy used by a number of payments for watershed 
services projects is the introduction of diversified livelihoods to compensate for the 
potentially negative impacts of reduced agricultural acreage. Examples include 
introduction of guinea pig farms or organic vegetable gardens.96 
 Community Education: Education is an important strategy for any payment for 
environmental services system. Creating and expanding knowledge within local 
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communities can help create support and understanding for how to best protect critical 
ecosystems. 
 
Results: Initially, the fund received $150,000 in seed funding from SABMiller. Within a year, the 
fund had raised over $1 million including over $300,000 each from the Inter-American 
Development Bank and the Bogota Water Company.97 The fund hopes to raise another $60 
million over the next 10 years, and estimates are that municipalities could save over $4 million 
annually by investing in upstream watershed protection.98 At the same time, the fund is 
expected to reduce the need for sediment-driven dredging activity and investment in additional 
water treatment facilities.99 
 
 
IIIDiii | Analogue: Habitat Conservation Banking 
 
Natural Resource Challenge: How to use proactive partnerships to address the fact that 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) regulations protect habitat for endangered species, but can be a 
disruptive and expensive way to protect species once on the brink of extinction.   
 
Organization: Gopher Tortoise Pilot 
Summary: Regulation to protect threatened and endangered species can significantly disrupt 
forest and land management schemes.100  Forest management, including stewardship and 
timber harvesting, is particularly at risk of disruption from species regulation. Stemming from 
wetlands mitigation tactics,101 Habitat Conservation Banking (HCB) involves protecting specific 
habitat in one location in exchange for undertaking forest management activities in another.102 
Landowners on qualified land are allotted “credits” that can be transferred to forest managers 
or land developers and used to comply with the habitat destruction mitigation required in 
Endangered Species Act’s Section 10.103  The objective of these types of initiatives is to 
“mitigate the effects human activities have on endangered species while creating an economic 
driver to incentivize the perpetual preservation of the habitat.”104  The US Fish and Wildlife 
Service (USFWS) approves landowners to sell credits to project developers seeking mitigation 
for l isted or at-risk species.105  
 
Federal regulations protecting species l isted on the ESA are cumbersome and can thwart land 
management activities and development.  Far simpler and less burdensome is managing for 
species that are not yet l isted, but are trending toward threatened or endangered status—
called “pre-compliance.”  Through pre-compliance habitat programs, landowners, government 
agencies, and businesses can take preemptive mitigation actions for species of concern prior to 
their l isting under ESA.  These mitigation activities would be accounted for as conservation 
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credits to be sold to project developers who are interested in mitigating future environmental 
risk of a potential ESA listing. These credits can be used toward meeting regulatory 
requirements if and when the species is later l isted under the ESA.  When selling credits, 
landowners contractually agree to manage their land to meet the specific habitat requirements 
of the species of concern in perpetuity.  The opportunity with such conservation credit 
programs is the potential to proactively contribute to the necessary conservation efforts that 
may 1) prevent species listing overall, 2) avoid the high compliance costs to meet regulatory 
standards under the ESA. 
 
Pre-Compliance Conservation Banking: The World Resources Institute (WRI) and Advanced 
Conservation Strategies (ACS) are developing a pilot conservation marketplace for the gopher 
tortoise in its non-federally-listed range of the Southeast United States.106 The pilot is intended 
to serve as a model for “advance mitigation” markets for candidate species—a concept that has 
gained considerable attention nationwide as a potential conservation and conflict resolution 
strategy for species like the sage grouse and lesser prairie chicken, and that is the subject of 
proposed rulemaking by the USFWS.107 
 
Pre-Compliance Conservation Banking is intended to be a proactive approach to manage for 
biodiversity and ESA “candidate” species.  This approach is taken before a species is listed as an 
endangered species and is intended to protect the species before regulation and compliance 
frameworks are established.108  Pre-compliance conservation is a proactive approach to 
environmental risk management that can harness the power of financial payments for 
biodiversity conservation.109  The ACS and WRI team is currently piloting this marketplace in 
Georgia with the Gopher Tortoise. 
 
Preliminary Outcomes: The environmental impact of this conservation mechanism is clear—
preventing the listing of species on the ESA.  By creating a market for habitat conservation, 
landowners are given a financial incentive to set aside tracts of land for protection. 
 
Federal and private developers, in particular, are poised to benefit from such a localized trading 
mechanism.  By preemptively reducing the risk that development projects will be thwarted by 
federal regulation from ESA listing, these entities will benefit from successful project 







IIIDiv | Lessons Learned  
 
In some ways, the principal lesson from the Theme 4 analogues is a reflection itself of the idea 
of the overall project—that practical solutions can be found by creative adaptation of existing 
ideas and tools for new purposes. However, while many of the analogues in earlier themes 
involved adapting from the starting point of existing corporate systems and mechanisms to 
sustainability or existing sustainability management policies to new applications, the analogues 
in Theme 4 emphasize that there are potential lessons to be learned from initiatives that are 
even further afield from customary corporate or sustainability contexts.  Whether its taking 
financial management tools from Wall Street to the prairies of the Midwest or a corporation 
like SABMiller joining forces at the local level with entities l ike the Inter-American Development 
bank, these analogues are evidence that scientists, policy makers and corporate managers are 
increasingly willing to cross traditional sector boundaries to design programs or form alliances 
to better meet common goals. More importantly, these cases illustrate a willingness to accept 
uncertainty and use judgment to balance multiple priorities in order to act proactively to 
mitigate future threats.  
 
 
IIIDv | Application to the Corporate and Water Context  
 
The analogues in this section have varying potential for application in the corporate and water 
context. Taken literally, lack of data and public sector support would likely impede ideas like 
modern portfolio theory or pre-compliance banking applied to watershed protection at the 
corporate level. However, at a more general level, the underlying principles could provide 
corporations with new insight into possible future water availability and management scenarios.  
 
For instance, although data about probabilities for water scarcity in different geographies under 
different climate outcomes may exist for certain watersheds, corporate access to this data or 
ability to interpret its variances and covariances is probably l imited.  In addition, necessary data 
about the cost of water management in different scenarios is even less l ikely to be widely 
available. However, companies could consider the cost of building the infrastructure necessary 
to respond to water provision at three future ground water levels—current, more scarce or 
very scarce and then assign a probability of occurrence to each in order to get an idea of what 
might be a reasonable amount to spend on preemptive water conservation or improvements.  
With even less data required, corporations could apply the idea of covariance to water risk 
mitigation by diversifying operations in areas with a l ikely negative correlation of future water 
availability. They could also apply the idea of probability-weighted scenarios to help understand 
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what water management might cost under different possible future water markets, given 
current scarcity. The possibilities are numerous.  
 
Similarly, the basic idea of pre-compliance banking markets, a proactive approach to an 
unknown future, can be applied by considering flexible investments in future capacity that 
could be leveraged in distinct ways. For example, an investment in human and organizational 
water expertise could pay off no matter where water problems are actually encountered. It is 
essentially a way of setting aside corporate “land” and resources for future application, l ike a 
prepaid utilities account.  
 
Cultural and Institutional Challenges: Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) projects tend to 
encounter resistance, both culturally and institutionally. Culturally, these initiatives ask 
communities to change their agricultural practices, many of which are likely to have deep 
rooted significance to the people. Encouraging these groups to cooperate with the program can 
be a significant challenge and will require a delicate touch and is not guaranteed to work. Local 
institutions are likely to present at least a moderate level of resistance to PES programs as well, 
as these groups tend to prefer familiar solutions. In the case of SABMiller, the water fund 
established received significant contributions from municipalities and other partners, which 
were ultimately necessary to achieve the outcomes desired. These contributions are not 
guaranteed in other areas, and making the case for PES is likely to be a hard sell.  
 
Implementation and Monitoring: Another challenge for effective PES programs is their 
administration and the monitoring of activity within the system. Administration refers to the 
work necessary to collect and manage funds, identify potential recipients, determine 
appropriate use of resources and distribution of capital. Monitoring refers to activities designed 
to ensure that distributed funds are being used appropriately, or that any agreements between 
parties remain un-violated. Managing this system will require a sizeable amount of 
organizational resources (more so in terms of person-hours and organizational expertise than 
financial) compared to other potential solutions.  
 
Geography and Transferability: PES programs are highly location-specific. SABMiller 
encountered a situation where terrain, soil composition, riparian layout and social factors 
created favorable conditions that would allow the use of efficiency measures upstream to 
create a greater supply of water downstream. In a different ecological context, it is uncertain 
whether a similar program would experience the same level of effect, or how much work would 
be required to adapt a similar approach to the local context. Thus, each program must be 
tailored to specific ecological and social contexts, meaning there is l imited transferability 
between programs. This means that organizations need to continue to devote relatively large 
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amounts of resources to the establishment of each additional program, limiting their overall 
effectiveness as a universal conservation tool.  
 
Though in its infancy, Pre-compliance Conservation Banking is, theoretically, most promising 
when looking to foresee future resource constraints and act preemptively.  The success of this 
model is yet to be determined as the gopher tortoise pilot is currently underway.  But 
theoretical applications can be made from the initial model to areas where resources are 
localized and future federal regulations may be impending. 
 
Freshwater 
Habitat conservation banking is a unique application of the “credit trading” mechanism.  What 
is attractive about this mechanism is the specific local nature of these credits.  Unlike carbon, 
which is global and not restricted to a local context, habitat is contextual.  This concept could be 
adapted to address local watershed water use by creating a market that allows for the selling 
and buying of water credits. Water (and habitat) is local and so local consideration and context 
must be given. 
 
Corporate Context 
In corporations structured with many different business units that operate independently, 
there is potential for an inter-corporation water-trading scheme between business units.  The 
challenge would be the transaction costs, coordination, and tracking.  According to the 
ACS/WRI team, the credit tracking and accounting system needs to be simple, but include these 
components: (1) Validate Entity Eligibility [e.g. proposed habitat parcel is important to 
freshwater provisioning], (2) Calculate, (3) Verify, (4) Register, (5) Track.110 
 
The concept of “pre-compliance” can be particularly applicable in areas where there is a 








IIIE | Analogue-Based Conclusions 
 
The cases outlined above are not only useful for bringing sustainability practices to an 
organization, the analogues they represent provide inspiration for innovative responses to 
many types of challenges posed by engaging with multiple stakeholders in an increasingly 
interconnected world.  Given the constraints of corporate structure, analogues will need to 
mimic or mirror existing systems and processes so as to reduce administrative burden and 
increase the likelihood of understanding and cross-organizational buy-in.  Microsoft, for 
example, specifically designed its carbon fee system to operationally align with existing 
accounting and decision-making structures.111 Further, the system is strategically aligned with 
the company’s interest in growing the role of technology in improving transparency and 
increasing awareness of efficiency across the company.  
 
Some cases incorporate partnerships with external entities, including non-profits.  For example, 
Disney’s carbon offset payments—totaling $15.5 million since 2009—are directed to forest 
restoration and protection projects, all channeled through environmental organizations like 
Conservation International and The Nature Conservancy.112  These partnerships bring 
environmental knowledge and expertise to the corporation, reducing the burden on the 
implementing organization.  Large environmental organizations are also reputable and often 
have positive networks with governments and communities, which can help ensure the 
corporation’s continued social l icense to operate in the local community. 
 
In the remainder of this section we seek to provide a more integrated perspective of the chosen 
analogues by highlighting some of their common trends and key differences.  First, we consider 
enabling conditions, benefits and limitations common to all analogues and then move to a 
comparison of traits found in some but not in others.  
 
 
IIIEi | Enabling Conditions 
 
A comparison of conditions that enabled implementation of the cases we studied reveals that 
there are three common types of enabling conditions — organizational fit, strategic fit, and 
technical fit.  
 
First, organizational fit relies on having an innovative corporate culture that is flexible, open to 
change and forward-looking. This encompasses organizational willingness to take on unfamiliar 
projects that may require coordination across units, evaluation of uncertainty and risk, and 
weighing of tradeoffs between multiple competing priorities.  It also implies “openness” to 
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learning and partnership with groups traditionally not valued as corporate stakeholders, 
including the non-profit and public sectors and local communities.  
 
Second, success is enabled by strategic fit. High-level support by corporate leaders who believe 
in the importance of the initiatives as an integral part of corporate strategy is essential for 
giving lower-level managers the freedom to innovate. Strategic fit can arise from multiple 
motivational drivers, including new regulation, potential for cost savings or reduced risk, to 
build public goodwill or to take advantage of a new revenue opportunity. Strategic fit is more 
likely to lead to adequate financial and human resources support and company-wide corporate 
endorsement, without which it can be difficult for individual business units or departments to 
approve new strategies. More specifically, the goals of specific environmental initiatives should 
align with corporate sustainability goals, which in turn align with overall corporate strategy for 
the future. In the case of water, this is most l ikely to occur when water is a key input for 
operations or manufacturing. It is even more likely to occur when the use of water is associated 
with the company’s social “license to operate” in a particular region. As a shared resource 
essential for daily l iving, water scarcity is particularly l ikely to provoke conflict with the 
community that could threaten the ability to conduct business in an area.  
 
Finally, the implementation of new sustainability-related initiatives is facilitated by technical 
alignment with existing accounting and data systems. For example, energy efficiency financing 
cases, especially those that involve power purchase agreements, are not a good fit with 
accounting systems and rules that do not allow for off-balance sheet financing. Internal trading 
mechanisms would likely be easier to implement in corporations with existing internal transfer 
pricing protocols than in those without them. Similarly, mechanisms that are retrospective, or 
based on measured use of designated resources, require tracking and recording systems that 
can distinguish the consumption of multiple users. This can be expensive or impractical to 
implement in some settings. For example, in manufacturing settings, water is usually measured 
at the point of inflow and outflow, but attributing its use to specific business units across a 
factory between the point of input and output can be difficult. On the other hand, prospective 
analogues, or those that depend on projections of future conditions, require the ability to 
reasonably forecast future scenarios.   
 
Though a fit in all three dimensions is helpful, it is not imperative that all three be in place from 
the beginning. We found that the most important dimension is cultural. Even with strong 
strategic reasons for implementation, corporations must first be willing to try something new 
and make a change. With an innovative, open culture, strategic opportunity can become 
apparent, and technical capacity can be developed to take advantage of the identified 
opportunity. Many of the cases profiled here can be influential sources of sustainability 
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education and innovative problem solving, which helps to expand a culture of sustainability 
thinking and bolster flexibility within the organization.  
 
 
IIIEii | Common Benefits 
 
We also found that the analogues examined shared four key benefits: changing incentive 
structures, providing a tool for multi-criteria decision-making on natural resource challenges, 
increasing awareness and focus on sustainability issues within an organization, and enhancing 
opportunities for employee and organizational learning. 
 
Changing incentive structures within corporations to align with organizational goals is critical to 
successful implementation.  Individuals will act based on the incentive structure in place. 
Therefore it is crucial to ensure that organizational incentive structures are made compatible 
with driving the behaviors that underlie successful mitigation of the natural resource challenge. 
For example, putting an internal price or tax on a natural resource will send a signal that 
reduces the resource’s consumption or use and drives efficiencies. A strong enough price signal 
can change not just usage behavior but also drive investment decisions as the return on 
investment and net present value of proposed projects will incorporate the tax or price. 
 
In prioritizing investments and corporate initiatives, decision-makers face considerable 
tradeoffs, and more often than not, financial metrics are the primary tradeoff examined.  
However, incorporating multi-criteria decision-making tools and metrics is a process that 
enables managers to move from using simple, often financial, metrics to weighing the tradeoffs 
between both financial and non-financial strategic criteria when making decisions. This 
common attribute highlights the multi-faceted nature of the outcomes derived from 
implementing an analogue and the benefits and costs that may or may not be quantifiable. 
 
Creating engaged and aware employees and consumers is of considerable value for 
implementing a response to a natural resource challenge and is often cited as one of the largest 
unforeseen benefits of sustainability initiatives. Increased awareness and focus on sustainability 
issues within an organization is an often underestimated means to drive employee buy-in, 
create positive brand image, and improve social license to operate in specific contexts.   Natural 
resource challenges ask corporations to consider a sometimes entirely new set of issues, and 
changing mindsets can be just as important as changing culture. 
 
Similar to creating awareness both internal and external to an organization, there is 
considerable opportunity for learning.  Addressing natural resource sustainability often requires 
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not only learning a new set of issues but also a new set of skills, for example, working with the 
public sector or using systems thinking. These skills can be transferred to improve performance 
in other unexpected areas.  
 
 
IIIEiii | Common Limitations 
 
All  the analogues analyzed face a common set of l imitations that can impair opportunities to 
fully realize their potential and impact on corporate decision-making. The following set of 
l imitations, ranging from quantifying impact to multi-scalar mismatch, highlight the most 
common barriers encountered. 
 
Given the emphasis placed on measurable results, the inability to conclusively attribute impacts 
to specific corporate actions is problematic. This ambiguity does not align with a corporate 
culture that requires results to justify new project investments. Quantifying impacts on 
resources, financial savings, and organizational and operational processes can be difficult as 
creating the correct metric and connecting it to the underlying change (investment or behavior) 
can be challenging. Reasons for this can be attributed to the non-linear systemic nature of 
natural resource trends, organizational complexity, and accounting practices. For example, in 
habitat conservation banking, the impact of land conservation to protect specific species may 
be insufficient to change or reverse species loss trends unless a critical parcel size is reached. 
However, positive impacts on the overall ecosystem health could be high. This lack of direct 
results can make it difficult to build a case for personal or financial support of a project or 
initiative. 
  
Each analogue hinges on achieving the desired outcome, but as mentioned above, measuring 
this outcome and attributing it to the mechanism can be difficult. Determining sufficient impact 
on natural resources, financial savings, and organizational improvements requires a balance 
between accounting for factors outside of a corporation’s control (e.g. climatic variability), as 
well as direct outcomes from mechanism implementation. For example, payments for 
ecosystem services impacts can be hard to measure because of the confounding influence of all 
other users of the watershed. However, the challenge of measurement does not mean that 
these projects do not provide real, substantial value.    
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Some degree of temporal, spatial, and jurisdictional cross-level and cross-scalar mismatchd 
must be overcome by each analogue. Temporal scale mismatch between shorter-term 
corporate decision-making time horizons (e.g. quarterly returns) and longer-term analogue 
investment returns can severely reduce likelihood of analogue adoption. Habitat conservation 
banking, payments for ecosystem services, and modern portfolio theory, for example, all rely 
on achieving the ecosystem-relevant scale to achieve desired outcomes. Further, because 
ecosystem spatial boundaries do not align with jurisdictional boundaries, land ownership at the 
local, state, and federal levels could make analogues irrelevant or inconsequential at the 
ecologically-relevant scale.  Attempted coordination across these scales can become mired in 
gridlock and inaction, due to parties’ pursuit of individual interests.   
 
Common across all the analogues is some degree of dependence on development of new 
internal technical and project management expertise. Even in a case when corporations can 
partner with outside organizations or hire new talent in order to quickly gain new skills 
necessary to implement unfamiliar sustainability initiatives, existing managers are often 
required to become conversant in a new language, and more importantly, a new way of 
thinking, about natural resource strategy. This kind of organizational change can be difficult to 
spread across large companies. For example, assigning a carbon tax or fee per unit of carbon 
requires the expertise to measure such output to quantify the amount to be charged to the 
business unit or entity and successful implementation may hinge upon ease of understanding of 
both the technical processes and strategic insights derived from the new system. 
 
 
IIIEiv | Benefit and Limitation Comparison  
 
The differences in benefits and limitations of individual analogues are perhaps even more 
important than their commonalities.  Considering the unique characteristics of the analogues 
will  better enable companies to pick and choose elements of different analogues that best 
match their particular context and goals. Table 4 organizes the analogues according to some of 
the key benefits they may provide. Table 5 provides the same overview for key limitations. Each 
table is followed by brief explanations of why each benefit or limitation was considered 
important for inclusion.  
                                                   
d Cross-level mismatch refers to misalignment along the same “scale,” for example, between the state and county 
jurisdictiona l levels. Cross-scalar mismatch refers to misalignment across scales, for example between the 
temporal and spatial scales.  
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Potential to generate funds: Identifying funding for environmental projects can be a barrier to 
successful resource management.  These analogues can help mitigate this challenge by either 
raising capital, providing monetary savings, reducing financial risk, or creating a market for 
efficiency project investments. 
 
Good preparation for external markets and/or regulation: Similar to the potential for an 
external carbon market, a future market and increased regulation for freshwater is a 
possibility.  Businesses that adopt innovative management practices can better position 
themselves to succeed in the face of potential regulation by shifting and changing behaviors to 
reduce impacts and achieve greater efficiency. 
 
Immediate impact on operations: Sustainability is a long-term issue, and it is often easier for 
organizations to neglect planning for the future than to implement policies that have an 
immediate tangible result on the business. These analogues are those that have the potential to 
create an immediate, operationally visible impact. 
 
Potential to be responsive to short-term conditions: In contrast to long-term agreements on a 
policy or course of action, these analogues are easily adjustable in the face of short-term 
climatic variability, for example, during drought conditions. 
 
Long-term planning: While a long-term view is implicit in any sustainability initiative, these 
analogues go the extra step by attempting to forecast future conditions beyond the 5-10 year 
time horizons generally used in corporate planning. As a result, they are likely to involve dealing 
with high levels of uncertainty.  
 
Allow decentralized decision-making and implementation: These analogues are good for 
implementing changes in large organizations with many business units with varying functions 
and goals because they allow for flexibility in how the mechanism is implemented. Some, l ike 
infrastructure management incentives and internal trading have a unified goal (e.g., carbon 
reduction), but allow for different means of reaching that goal. Others, like green infrastructure 
portfolio standards and green revolving funds, may be set up to allow managers to define their 




Holistic view of total impact across multiple units: These analogues are important in that they 
provide either trading or offsetting mechanisms that leverage variation across individual units 
to achieve an overall goal.  
 
Focus on decision-making, not outcomes-driven: Even if designed with a target goal in mind, 
these analogues do not guarantee or mandate the desired outcome. Instead, they change 
decision-making procedures or incentives in order to promote desired actions. As a result, 
results depend largely on the degree of adoption and implementation by managers. 
 
Opportunity to provide non-monetary rewards: The simplified permitting process and other 
non-monetary incentives in the Infrastructure Management Incentives analogues can get 
managers thinking about creative non-monetary awards like expedited project approval in a 
capital constrained context,  
 
Reduces barriers to accessing capital: When access to capital is the barrier to implementing 
projects that would otherwise be approved, these analogues may provide means of reducing 
those barriers by transferring longer-than-accepted payback periods to more patient investors 
or by forming a partnership to take advantage of complementary strengths of a partner (e.g., 
tax status) that make the overall project cheaper. 
 
Requires less internal technical expertise through transferring risk to expert external partners: 
Water and sustainability projects often require technical expertise outside the traditional 
corporate realm. These analogues reduce the need for additional employee training or new 
hires by engaging a knowledgeable external partner.  
 
Address root cause of problem: Most of the mechanisms profiled in this paper are corporate 
responses to the symptoms of water scarcity. The mechanisms enable the company to find 
ways of using less water or to use it more efficiently. These analogues go further to address the 
root cause of water scarcity by addressing watershed health and water capture.  
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Impacts future actions, not existing operations: Compounding the challenge of convincing 
business units to take action now because of the possibility of uncertain events in the future is 
the fact that decision-makers usually find it easier to amend processes governing future actions 
rather than current ones. For example, incorporating a shadow price of carbon or water into a 
future investment may alter decisions about the type or location of infrastructure construction, 
but it does not require immediate behavioral changes to be made. However, such procedural 
changes do have the potential to avoid significant future negative impacts. The downside is that 
existing operations continue unchanged and that few individuals outside planning functions 
may be exposed to the sustainability principles embodied in the policy, making it harder to use 
the decisions as means to instigate cultural changes that allow for more immediate action at a 
later date. 
 
High transaction costs: Analogues that require significant coordination within the organization 
can incur high transaction costs in the form of large, ongoing requirements of employee time. 
While there are often high learning costs associated with implementing a new sustainability 
initiative, not all of them continue to require significant investment once they are set up. 
Internal trading mechanisms are an example of a mechanism that would require continuous 
renegotiation between participating units. Analogues with high coordination transaction costs 
are most l ikely to be useful when there are large gains to be made from more efficient 
allocation of resources or responsibility for action. 
 
Lower financial returns: It is important to state that not all sustainability projects have low 
financial returns, even by corporate standards. Energy efficiency projects, for example, may 
have short payback periods with double-digit returns. However, some projects will require 
companies to approve investments with returns lower than their standard hurdle rate. 
 
Least flexible as to how the desired change is achieved: These analogues designate specific 
actions that must be taken in order to achieve the desired effect. These contrast with other 
more flexible mechanisms that allow different units to choose their own methods for achieving 
the desired result. If the action is difficult, it could be met with resistance. On the other hand, if 
the actions are simple, it can save redundant planning. Accordingly, they require well-
substantiated and defined actions in order to be successful.  
  
May violate internal corporate governance: There are two particular characteristics of some 
analogues that make them more likely to violate internal corporate governance standards. The 
first are long-term contracts. Long-term contracts differ from adopting long-term time horizons 
for planning in that corporations are legally obligated to fulfill certain duties, often for 10-15 
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years. The long-term contracts enable initiatives like power purchase agreements by, among 
other things, lowering the cost of financing. However, some large corporations have corporate 
governance statutes l imiting contracts to far shorter timeframes. Long-term contracts may be 
especially hard to get approved in highly volatile industries. The second characteristic is the 
debt to equity ratio, which can be higher than corporate standards in projects heavily financed 
by debt. 
 
Requires partnerships with external stakeholders: These analogues depend on partnering with 
external stakeholders for implementation. These partners often come from different sectors or 
industries than more typical corporate partners. As mentioned above, this can provide a 
learning opportunity. For example, learning how to engage with non-profits and the public 
sector. At the same time, any partnership with an external stakeholder imposes risk. There is 
the reputational risk of being associated with a partner whose goals may not align as well as the 
operational risk of the experimental relationship, and therefore the initiative, going differently 
than planned.  It i s essential to find a trusted, capable partner with the desired complementary 
expertise. 
 
Upfront capital investment: Sustainability investments, even those that will generate financial 
returns above corporate hurdle rates, are often difficult to get approved in capital-constrained 
environments due to a bias towards investing money in what are seen as core business 
operations.  
 
Success depends on location-specific geological and ecosystem conditions: These are only 
suitable for implementation in areas with specific geological, ecosystem or climatic conditions. 
Evaluating potential for success involves making decisions location-by-location instead of 
company-wide. 
 
Greater potential for jurisdictional and spatial mismatch: Though all the analogue mechanisms 
are prone to scalar mismatch, these are especially likely to encounter jurisdictional and spatial 
misalignment that may make implementation more difficult as they rely on one or more 




SECTION IV | APPLICATION OF FINDINGS 
 
As stated above, The Dow Chemical Company has emerged as a leader in the field of corporate 
ecosystem service management. One example of this commitment was the start of a five-year, 
$10 million partnership between Dow and The Nature Conservancy (TNC). This groundbreaking 
collaboration is working to value priority ecosystem services at three Dow pilot sites around the 
world.  Work at the first site in Freeport, Texas is nearly complete and efforts in Brazil have 
begun. Work is expected to begin on a third site this year. 
 
With this in mind, the team sought to adapt lessons learned through the extensive analogue 
analyses to the specific context of helping The Dow Chemical Company develop a new tool to 
address water scarcity. We sought to define a strategy that would seamlessly integrate with 
established business practices to address water scarcity via sustainable reductions in water 
withdrawals rather than by increasing supply.e Key operational, organizational and financial 
attributes of The Company guided our considerations and ultimately, our recommendations to 
develop the best fit solution for Dow today. As indicated earlier, the mechanism developed 
needed to be flexible across water policy contexts. As a firmly structured organization, the 
solution needed to be designed to fit existing organizational processes. With Dow being an 
expert in water and process technologies, the team sought to develop a tool to influence 
decision-making, not technological choices. Finally, as a company with strong competing 
demands for investment capital, the solution developed needed to have its own source of 
funding. 
 
Through conversations with key players within Dow, it became clear that sustainable financing 
is the greatest challenge within the organization when it comes to developing the sustainability 
projects that will help Dow to address its exposure to freshwater scarcity. With a low ROI and 
distant-feeling risk, water sustainability projects are hard to make the case for in all but the 
most proactive and sustainability-minded of organizations. This challenge is compounded by 
the competing need to invest scarce capital into regulatory-required or business growth 
projects. Avoiding the uncertain risk of the avoided cost from lost production is simply too 
difficult a case to make when it comes to allocating limited funds among projects. 
 
                                                   
e Our intent with this project is to influence long-term sustainability. Therefore, we focused our analysis and 
recommendations to The Dow Chemical Company on opportunities to reduce freshwater consumption and/or 
recycle water and not on opportunities to temporarily increase supply, such as through buying options to 
additional water rights or increasing reservoir capacity.  
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The team then evaluated each of the 10 analogues for potential application, given what had 
been discovered about the context presented by The Dow Chemical Company and the central 
challenge of financing water sustainability projects. Through additional discussions with 
stakeholders at Dow, it was determined that the more “traditional” and tested analogues from 
the carbon and financing themes would be the building blocks with the best chance for 
adoption at Dow.  
 
The Journey to an Environmental Fund 
 
The in-depth analysis of analogues discussed above provided a suite of mechanisms through 
which freshwater management issues at Dow might be addressed.  The aforementioned 
interviews with Dow personnel generated the following idea by the team of a complete-via-
combination system: 
 Generate investment capital internally through a fee-based water use mechanism 
 Use fees generated as seed capital for a revolving investment fund 
 Prioritize investment decisions for water-related capital expenditures while using higher 
ROI projects (e.g., energy efficiency) for cross-subsidization. 
 
Building from the analogue benefits and limitations outlined above, we were able to identify a 
way in which multiple analogues could be used in a complimentary manner to achieve Dow’s 





This unique combination of mechanisms was designed to address Dow’s needs for fundraising, 
prioritization, and continuity. However, as the team proceeded with additional primary 
research within a specific Dow manufacturing site, some additional limitations to this approach 
were identified. First, charging an internal fee for water usage would not be viable due to the 
integrated operations of The Company and the potential for a fee to raise the cost of doing 




fees generate $$$ 




Figure 6: Preferred Fund Structure 
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business between business units, making it difficult to remain competitive in a very price 
sensitive industry. In addition, it was deemed too operationally difficult to manage a revolving 
fund since Dow’s integrated operations prevented accurate monitoring of cost savings pass-
through. One possible workaround we suggested for this would be to identify a reasonable 
proxy such as a metric measuring resource input efficiency, which would allow savings to be 
tracked closely, if not directly. Another option, as suggested in a joint report between the 
Sustainable Endowments Institute and the Association for Advancement of Sustainability in 
Higher Education, “is to conduct a less rigorous assessment of whether utility costs are 
decreasing over time. This will not be sufficient to calculate project repayments, but it can help 
verify that a project or portfolio of projects is decreasing costs broadly.”113 
 
Amended Proposal for Dow: Mixed application fund with special allocation to environmental 
challenges 
 
Through further iterations and discussions with environmental and finance team members from 
across Dow corporate and plant operations, we refined our thinking and developed a proposal 
that combines elements from two analogues - GIPS and revolving funds – with a balanced 
scorecard approach to performance evaluation. Rather than generating funds internally 
through a fee-based mechanism, this proposed solution will need to be funded through a 
special initial capital infusion to a parallel funding pool managed within the traditional capital 
budgeting process at Dow. A balanced scorecard approach was recommended to measure and 
report on the non-financial impact of these capital investments. This would serve to 
supplement the metrics currently evaluated in the capital budgeting process and facilitate the 
annual renewal of Sustainability Footprint project funding. 
 
Key Features (Figure 7): 
 Uses metrics that go beyond traditional ROI 
 Combines projects impacting different resources, with aim to reduce consumption of 
each 
 Managed outside of standard capital budgets to eliminate direct competition with 
critical funding for today’s regulatory requirements and/or business growth imperatives 
 
This recommended strategy is sensitive to the financial realities and processes in place at The 
Company and is flexible to allow for the varied operational and policy contexts in which Dow 
faces freshwater scarcity challenges around the globe. Further, it addresses the desire of The 
Company to frame and address sustainability holistically, while still carving out freshwater 






















In discussions with Dow, a few additional organizational management and execution limitations 
were discovered including scale, budgeting process, and long-term viability. We recommended 
the following steps to address these issues:  
 
Start with a small scale pilot – Gaining sustainable funding for these types of capital investment 
projects is, as noted previously, challenging. As such, we recommended starting first with a 
pilot project led by the thought leaders and more proactive groups within the organization.  
 
Leverage current processes and systems – Given the size and matrix-based structure of the 
organization we recognize the challenges of large-scale change management. Consequently, we 
recommended The Company to build the Sustainability Fund in parallel to current processes 
and thus limit the introduction of new complex structures. 
 
Ensure long-term viability of the fund – Dow has made numerous investments in the identified 
target areas in the past. However, these have often been one-off investments and therefore 
have not created the lasting, sustainable value that was originally sought through initiating 
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Buy-in from senior level leadership – To successfully implement the Fund, the Fund’s 
instigators must gain buy-in from high-level leadership. 
 
Tie the purpose and operation of the Fund directly to the broader organization’s 
environmental strategy – Tying the Fund directly to the 2015 Sustainability Goals and 
potentially, a new post-2015 sustainability investment goal is one potential option to 
achieve this. We also recommend identifying individual champions and influencers 
within the organization. These individuals could make up an internal “board of directors” 
or “review committee” to ensure oversight by different business units as well as project-
type champions (e.g., energy efficiency, water, etc.). Committed Fund managers and a 
l ink to The Company’s sustainability commitments should help to ensure on-going 
support beyond the initial approval of the Fund, as well as facilitate protection and 
commitment through future economically challenging times. 
 
Oversight conducted by corporate or EH&S – Oversight of the Fund should come from a 
corporate entity with broad reach, such as Global Environmental Health and Safety. This 
will  ensure that individual business units are not forced to divert funds from elsewhere 
in their budget and also allow the capital to be deployed in a manner that provides the 
greatest net benefit to the organization as a whole. 
 
Capital Investment Scorecard – Another way to improve the long-term viability of the 
Fund is through creating a capital investment scorecard that measures the non-financial 
impact of capital investments in environmental projects. This scorecard would 
supplement the metrics currently evaluated in the capital budgeting process to 
communicate the environmental benefits of capital investment projects to justify 
continued funding.  
 
Ultimately, the ability for a chosen implementation strategy to integrate as seamlessly as 
possible into a business will depend on its organizational fit.  Developing a response mechanism 
that can be integrated without disrupting current organizational structure can reduce the 
barriers to implementation and ease the burden of ongoing management. If the chosen 
response to a natural resource challenge requires centralized corporate decision-making or 
more decentralized, business unit-specific approaches, the design of the mechanism must 
reflect this need. The implementing business division or unit must have organizational oversight 
over the respective operations further down the organizational chart.  For example, the tax or 
fee approach should build on current pricing and costing structures and require minimal 
changes on behalf of those carrying out the operational functions. Beyond structure is the 
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question of fit with organizational culture.  Employee buy-in to the reasoning behind program 
implementation can help overcome barriers of misunderstanding and even build excitement 
around support for sustainability-enhancing initiatives.  
  
An additional consideration critical to moving initiatives forward is identifying and cultivating a 
“champion” with formal or informal influence and authority to propose innovative responses. A 
champion can approve, lobby for or allocate financing to carry a project through to execution. 
Though responses that build on current organizational features will face fewer barriers to 
implementation, identifying the committed, driving human force customized to a centralized or 
decentralized structure is essential.  This person or persons will promote understanding, build 







We first approached The Dow Chemical Company with our proposal to do a Ma ster’s Project 
because we were excited about their partnership with The Nature Conservancy and the 
possibility of taking science-based valuations of ecosystems services and embedding them into 
the corporate decision-making process of a large multi-national corporation. In the end, our 
proposed solution represents a less direct method of doing so than initially envisioned because 
of the unique challenges related to water and ecosystem services in the private sector. 
However, we believe that the analogues examined do provide hope that creative solutions to 
tackling these challenges can be successful. 
 
The disparate forms of water policy throughout different locales around the world make it 
challenging for a multinational company to implement company-wide water initiatives. 
However, this is not a reason for companies to neglect addressing water-related issues, but 
instead precisely the reason they should take steps internally at the corporate level. The sooner 
corporations begin to internally manage water use, the better prepared they will be when 
scarcity dictates that conservation measures are essential for business functioning or required 
by regulation. 
 
Through our work with Dow, we gained first-hand exposure to the challenges of 
operationalizing the outcome of ecosystem service valuation. In all instances, adding an internal 
price to a commodity that is historically free hinders the company’s ability to compete in the 
market. Consequently, we worked with Dow to help shift the focus to reducing overall 
dependence on ecosystem services, an approach that reduces risk regardless of the future 
scenario that unfolds.  
 
Finally, working with Dow helped us learn that problems such as freshwater availability in the 
corporate context can be addressed through means already proven to address other challenges. 
We firmly believe that the analogues outlined in this report can be combined in various ways to 
both overcome their individual shortcomings as well as meet the individual needs of an 
organization. The solution we developed accomplishes just that. However, we plan to share 
these findings broadly in the corporate community through webinars and other means to 
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Summary of Cross-Basin Institutional Identification and Classification Research Collaboration 
 
As a major component of our exploration of the “policy response” category, as opposed to 
technological and management responses (see “Determining the Approach”), we undertook a 
basin-scale water governance research project in collaboration with The Nature Conservancy 
(TNC). Through this work, the team set out to explore the potential for policy responses to 
meet the goals of our project, while also contributing to the policy analysis work of TNC as part 
of the broader TNC-Dow collaboration. The team worked with TNC to define a set of research 
questions that would inform a larger cross-basin institutional analysis that was then getting 
underway at TNC. While the team’s work on this particular research subject did not end up 
being integral to our pursuit of a creative approach to corporate water scarcity management as 
informed by natural resource management analogues, we learned a lot from this research 
endeavor and therefore include a summary of our work in this Appendix. 
 
 
Aim of the Research Collaboration 
 
The purpose of our cross-basin analysis was to provide an idea of potential future institutional 
and market price conditions for water in a specific set of locations. We set out to accomplish 
this by analyzing and categorizing the different institutional a rrangements in basins with 
different water scarcity and general governance conditions. Our work involved the following 
general steps, as informed by a selection of existing journal articles on institutional and 
governance systems categories, and our own research into the governance, institutional, legal 
and community context of each specific location:  
 
1. Define the categories for water institutions and pricing mechanisms  
2. Categorize institutions and pricing mechanisms in the selected basins 
3. Compile a detailed summary of how these different water institutions and pricing 





Our research revealed a wide range of institutions governing freshwater access and use. We 
began by placing each relevant institution into one of three governance categories:  
 Regulatory authority over water use and treatment (access, distribution, discharge, 
quality)  
 Water provisioning (i.e., infrastructure & maintenance--usually municipal or public-
private partnership) 
 Water advocate / influencers (e.g., citizens groups, watersheds protection NGOs; often 




Further, we found that regulatory aspects are usually addressed at local, state and national 
levels and sometimes internationally, as well. Even at the local and state level, we found that 
governance may be controlled by an individual entity or a group of entities (e.g., Great Lakes 
Council of Governors). Regulatory authority is usually driven by the government, but is 
occasionally agreed upon as part of a voluntary agreement amongst watershed inhabitants or 
other stakeholders. We also found that regulations have different authority and accountability 
depending on how the regulation was enacted, such as by decree, treaty, or legislation. 
 
As well, we found that "governance" categories themselves are not usually collective, market or 
state as discussed in the literature, but rather a combination of state plus one of the others (we 
did not encounter a situation in which the state is entirely uninvolved). Thus we re-defined our 




 All of the above with different combinations of local, national, international 
 
Additionally, we discussed how broadly water governance should be defined. A governance 
regime could encompass just the actors and institutions that have direct control over water 
resources or it could also be considered to include non-authoritative actors, e.g., related 
advisory bodies, or stakeholder groups. 
 
 
Key Challenges Encountered 
 
In the course of conducting this research and categorization work, we found it difficult to access 
available information on each basin’s specific institutions at the level necessary to inform our 
project. With many overlapping jurisdictions and numerous governance regimes possible within 
any single basin, it was difficult to identify Dow-relevant governance information from a basin-
level approach. As a result, we shifted from a basin-level approach to a site-outward approach, 
in which we sought information specific to each Company site, starting first with local 
institutions and moving out to more broad scales as necessary. 
 
In addition, many water governance institutions are often not spatially compatible with the 
ecologically relevant spatial extent. This mismatch further complicates the utility of making 
policy-based recommendations because Dow itself operates at a totally different spatial level 
that also does not match either ecological or political boundaries. 
 
The information we were able to collect (displayed in Table C 1, below) shows incredible variety 
in the governance of water. These results incited further discussion within the team and with 
our collaborators at TNC to explore the strength of the research collected, and the usefulness of 
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the result for our overall project goals. 
 
Ultimately, we determined that the time required for the team to pursue policy-based 
responses would detract from our ability to achieve the objectives of our project. As made clear 
by the diversity of institutions we documented governing freshwater access, any policy-based 
solution would only be applicable in one location and only while that specific layering of policies 
was in effect. We determined this was contrary to our goal of developing an organization-wide 
strategy that would also have longevity. Thus, the outcomes of this cross-basin governance 
research exercise provided further basis for the team to pursue management-based solutions, 
which the team felt provided stronger promise of developing recommendations that would be 
relevant across a multinational corporation and over time, regardless of any changes in the 
many layers of policies that govern freshwater access. However, we also recognize that the 
local institutional setting for any site can affect the options available within a management-
based response. For example, the menu of options for addressing water scarcity through 
investment at a given corporate site may or may not include expanding access to the resource, 







(Self /  public utility / 




(rights / market 









Price Set By (utility / 
trading / state / 
withdrawal rights) 
1 Public Utility Rights Restricted  Coalition  Withdrawal rights 
2 Public Utility Rights Unrestricted International law 
Member states as 
governed by government 
directive 
3 Public Utility State Restricted State law 
state (use charges for 
withdrawal from state-






limited by WW 
source, limited surface 
water withdrawal 
rights 
Mix of water agencies oversee 
portfolio of local surface water 
withdrawal 
Surface water rights, 
maintenance and 
production costs paid by 
industrial users 
5 Self  
Rights: industrial 
use permit for 
withdrawals  
Unrestricted (?) 
State Division of Water, plus eight 
investor-owned water companies, 22 
water associations, 117 water districts, 
and 92 municipal water utilities 
Water district or 
association 
6 Assumed Self Rights 
Restricted: per 
rights if riparian owner 
Riparian rights owners or State (via 
Cooperative Endeavour Agreement) 
Use rights or "Fair 
market value" deemed by 
State. Free if use 
demonstrated "public 
interest" 
7 Assumed Self Rights Restricted 
Riparian rights owners or State (via 
Cooperative Endeavour Agreement) 
Use rights or "Fair 
market value" deemed by 
State. Free if use 
demonstrated "public 
interest" 
8 Public Utility State Unrestricted 
International agreement, multi-state 
law 
Utility (?) 
9 Public Utility State Unrestricted 
International agreement, multi-state 
law 
Utility (?) 
10 Public Utility State Unrestricted State-federal agency agreement PUC 
11       International law   







(Self / public utility / 
private utility / 
public-private utility) 
Water Allocation 
(rights / market 








Price Set By (utility / 
trading / state / 
withdrawal rights) 
12       International law   
13     Unrestricted State River basin committee 
14 Public Utility State Unrestricted International agreement Utility 
15 Public Utility State Restricted None Utility 
16 Utility Rights Unrestricted   Utility 
17 Utility  Rights     Withdrawal rights 
18 Self Rights Restricted   Withdrawal rights 
19 Utility        Withdrawal rights 
20 Public Utility Rights Restricted    Utility  
21       Multi-state coaltion   
22 PPP Model Hybrid Unrestricted International coalition Utility 
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